Trump’s tariffs still hang over global trade
U.S. trade policy is once again among the most important global economic topics, and not only because of the level of individual tariffs, but even more because of the uncertainty surrounding them. After a series of political announcements, executive decisions, and legal challenges, companies, exporters, and investors are still trying to answer the same question: what of all this will actually remain in force, and what is primarily a means of pressure in negotiations. That very indeterminacy has become one of the biggest problems for international trade, because large companies do not plan procurement, production, and logistics for next week, but for months in advance.
In practice, this means that decisions on opening new plants, reshuffling supply chains, or concluding long-term contracts are increasingly being made under the pressure of political risk. When Washington announces a new round of tariffs, then postpones part of the measures, softens part of them, and part enters a legal dispute, the market remains between two extremes: on the one hand it cannot ignore the threat, and on the other it cannot be sure that the announced regime will truly survive. That is why trade policy has once again become an important driver of prices, investment decisions, and market sentiment, from North America to Europe and Asia.
From protecting domestic industry to a broader geopolitical instrument
During 2025, President Donald Trump’s administration returned tariffs to the center of economic policy, presenting them as a tool to protect domestic industry, reduce dependence on imports, and pressure trading partners. In February 2025, the White House announced decisions that tightened measures on steel and aluminum imports, and official documents state that rates for aluminum were raised to 25 percent and that numerous exemptions and special regimes that had softened the effect of those measures in previous years were abolished. In June 2025, Washington further tightened its approach to steel and aluminum imports, confirming that this was not a short-term political signal but a longer-term direction of trade policy.
In the American rationale, the emphasis was placed on national security and preserving the industrial base. Such wording is not new, because the United States relied on the same argument in earlier tariff disputes as well, but in Trump’s second term it gained a significantly broader political and economic reach. Tariffs are no longer only a matter of protecting individual sectors such as metallurgy, but also a signal that Washington wants to retain room for maneuver for broader negotiations with partners, including issues of production, technology, logistics, and trade deficits.
As a result, trade policy ceased to be a narrowly technical issue of interest only to customs services and specialized lawyers. It once again became an instrument of geopolitical positioning. When the world’s largest economy uses tariffs both as negotiating pressure and as an industrial measure, the consequences do not remain within American borders. They spill over into raw material prices, transport costs, investment decisions, and the overall assessment of risk in international exchange.
Legal disputes did not reduce uncertainty, but deepened it
One of the key reasons why tariffs still hang over global trade is the fact that the debate is no longer only about whether they should exist, but also about on what authority the American president can even resort to such broad measures. In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, known by the acronym IEEPA, cannot be used as a legal basis for imposing such broad tariffs on imported goods. That decision was an important blow to part of Trump’s tariff strategy and raised the issue of refunding amounts already collected as well as the future limits of presidential trade powers.
But after that, the markets did not receive a simple answer or lasting stability. Instead of a clear resolution, a new round of uncertainty opened up. The administration very quickly began seeking other legal bases for similar or substitute measures, and the Associated Press and specialized legal sources note that new proceedings and investigations were launched in an effort to restore tariff pressure within a different legal framework. For the business sector, that may be an even more difficult scenario than a high tariff rate itself: the problem is not only that something is expensive, but that no one knows with certainty whether in three months it will be more expensive, cheaper, or whether the rules will again fundamentally change.
Such legal fluidity particularly affects companies that operate globally. Multinational companies do not determine production according to a single tariff, but according to the expected cost regime over a longer period. If one legal foundation collapses in court and another is immediately activated, companies are left without a stable planning horizon. In such an environment, more and more defensive business decisions appear: larger inventories, more cautious investments, delaying expansion, and seeking alternative suppliers, even when they are more expensive.
The European Union, Canada, and China responded with their own measures
American decisions did not go unanswered. On March 12, 2025, the European Commission announced that it was launching countermeasures on U.S. imports after new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum from the European Union and other partners entered into force. Brussels called those American moves unjustified and announced a proportionate response to protect European producers, workers, and consumers. Subsequently, the European Commission also announced that part of the planned measures had been temporarily put on hold to leave room for negotiations, but at the same time clearly stated that a large part of European exports to the United States was already affected by the new American tariffs or the threat of such measures.
Canada reacted just as decisively. An official statement by the Canadian Department of Finance says that, as of March 13, 2025, Ottawa introduced reciprocal tariffs of 25 percent on American goods with a total value of almost 29.8 billion Canadian dollars, including steel and aluminum products and an additional wide range of goods. In this way, the largest foreign supplier of steel and aluminum to the American market sent a message that it would not passively accept a change in the rules without a response.
China had already earlier retaliated against the American tightening of tariffs with its own levies on part of U.S. agricultural products, and during March 2026 it again warned that new American moves could seriously damage the trade relations of the world’s two largest economies. In practice, that means that tariff policy is no longer a bilateral dispute between Washington and one partner, but a network of retaliatory measures and threats spreading across multiple markets and sectors. In such an environment, even companies that do not directly export to the United States can feel the consequences, for example through more expensive inputs, changes in orders, or redirection of goods to other markets.
The biggest cost may not be the tariff itself, but unpredictability
When tariffs are discussed, the public most often perceives them as a simple tax on imports that makes goods more expensive. That is correct, but only partially. In real business operations, a major cost arises even before the tariff is actually collected. An announcement alone is enough for companies to start changing logistics routes, speeding up deliveries, stockpiling inventories, or shifting part of their orders elsewhere. In its assessments during 2025, the OECD warned that higher trade barriers and increased uncertainty were weakening the global growth outlook, and in its September interim assessment it additionally emphasized that part of trade in the first half of the year had been sustained also because of so-called front-loading, that is, accelerated imports before the expected further tightening of measures.
That is an important nuance. The figures can sometimes look more resilient than the real situation in the background. If companies rush to import goods before a higher tariff, trade activity may look strong in the short term. But such an upswing is not a sign of healthy growth, but a sign of fear of future costs. After that, a slowdown often follows, because warehouses are full, orders have already been pulled forward, and companies become more cautious with new investments.
The International Monetary Fund sent a similar message as well. In January 2026, the IMF assessed that the world economy had shown surprising resilience despite U.S.-led trade disruptions, but warned that risks remained elevated and that the negative effects of trade disruptions could accumulate over time. In other words, current resilience does not mean that the problem has disappeared. On the contrary, it may mean only that the full effect is being transmitted with a delay, through slower investment, higher financing costs, and more cautious consumption.
Supply chains seek stability, not political improvisation
For global supply chains, predictability is crucial. A manufacturer of cars, household appliances, medical equipment, or electronic components does not function by redrawing the entire supplier map every month. Large systems depend on long-term contracts, standardized parts, transport capacity reserved in advance, and strict delivery deadlines. When the tariff regime constantly changes or threatens to change overnight, the entire system loses efficiency.
That is precisely why tariffs on steel and aluminum are much more than a sectoral issue for the metallurgical industry. Those materials go into a long series of products, from construction structures and machines to cars, packaging, and consumer electronics. When a basic industrial input becomes more expensive or legally uncertain, the cost can spill over into a range of other sectors. Some companies will try to pass part of the burden on to customers, some will temporarily absorb it through lower margins, and some will simply postpone decisions on expansion or new hiring.
At the end of 2025, the European Central Bank warned that uncertainty about trade agreements and the long-term effects of tariffs was still shaping the financial stability of the euro area. That is an important message because it shows that the issue is no longer limited to trade in goods. Tariffs and threats of tariffs move into the sphere of financial stability, asset valuation, and the resilience of companies to shocks. When banks, investors, and corporations cannot reliably assess future trade costs, the price of caution rises throughout the entire system.
What the markets are actually trying to assess
Investors, exporters, and economists are currently not assessing only one figure, for example whether a tariff will be 10, 25, or 50 percent. They are assessing several levels of risk at the same time. The first is legal: can a measure survive in court. The second is political: is the announcement serving as actual policy or as pressure in negotiations. The third is international: will partners respond reciprocally. The fourth is macroeconomic: how much will all this slow growth, push inflation, and change the direction of investment.
That is precisely why the same announcement can have consequences even before it enters into force. If the market concludes that the threat is serious, companies will immediately begin adjusting their business operations. If it concludes that it is a negotiating maneuver, it still will not completely ignore the possibility that what was announced will ultimately be implemented. That state of permanent readiness consumes money and time, reduces efficiency, and makes international trade more expensive even without the formal introduction of all the threatened measures.
Because of this, business circles are increasingly saying that trade uncertainty has become a separate cost. It has no single tariff rate and is not visible on a single invoice, but it appears in more expensive insurance, larger inventories, backup suppliers, slower investment decisions, and caution that erodes productivity. This is especially sensitive for smaller exporters that do not have the financial strength of large multinational systems and find it harder to absorb sudden changes in market conditions.
Global trade is not standing still for now, but it is entering a more sensitive phase
Official international indicators do not point to an immediate collapse of world trade, but they clearly show that pressures are growing. At the end of 2025, the WTO announced that the value of global imports affected by new tariffs and other import measures in the observed period had increased by more than four times compared with the previous twelve months, reaching the highest level in more than fifteen years of WTO monitoring. Such data do not speak only about one dispute or one country, but about a broader change in the international trade environment.
In other words, the world is gradually moving away from a period in which the rules of trade liberalization were regarded as an almost given framework. Instead, space is growing for selective protective measures, industrial policy, and geopolitically motivated trade decisions. American tariffs under Trump are one of the most visible symptoms in that process, but also a powerful trigger for the reactions of other major economies.
That does not mean that global exchange will stop. It is more likely that it will become more expensive, slower, and more administratively demanding. Part of production could move closer to end markets, some companies will continue to diversify suppliers, and some trade will be redirected among third countries. But all of that has a price. Under ideal circumstances, supply chains are optimized for efficiency, and under conditions of constant tariff threat they are optimized for resilience. Such a transition is possible, but it is almost never cheap.
As of March 18, 2026, perhaps the most accurate description of the situation is precisely this: Trump’s tariffs are not only a matter of already introduced rates, but a matter of permanent uncertainty about future moves, legal bases, and international responses. That is why they still hang over global trade. Not because every threat has already been turned into an implemented measure, but because the very possibility of a new escalation is enough to change the behavior of companies, investors, and states long before the tariff bill comes due.
Sources:- The White House – decision to raise U.S. tariffs on aluminum and abolish part of the exemptions, February 2025. (link)- The White House – decision on further tightening measures for steel and aluminum, June 2025. (link)- SCOTUSblog – overview of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that challenged the use of IEEPA for broad tariffs, February 2026. (link)- Associated Press – report on new proceedings by the Trump administration after the judicial blow to tariff policy, March 2026. (link)- European Commission – announcement of countermeasures to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum, March 12, 2025. (link)- European Commission – additional explanation of the European response and the scope of the American measures, March 12, 2025. (link)- European Commission – data that around 379 billion euros of EU exports to the U.S. are affected by new American tariffs or the threat of tariffs, and on the temporary pause of part of the European countermeasures for negotiations, April 2025. (link)- Government of Canada – Canadian reciprocal tariffs on American goods worth 29.8 billion Canadian dollars, March 12, 2025. (link)- Associated Press – Chinese countermeasures on American agricultural products after the new American tightening of tariffs, March 2025. (link)- Associated Press – China’s warning that new American tariff moves could damage trade relations, March 2026. (link)- OECD – warning that trade barriers and increased uncertainty are weakening the global growth outlook, June 2025. (link)- OECD – interim assessment emphasizing that part of trade was temporarily boosted due to accelerated imports before higher tariffs, September 2025. (link)- IMF – assessment that the world economy is showing resilience despite trade disruptions, with a warning about delayed negative effects, January 2026. (link)- European Central Bank – financial stability review warning that uncertainty about trade agreements and the effects of tariffs remains an important risk, November 2025. (link)- WTO – data that the value of global imports affected by new tariffs and other measures increased by more than four times and reached the highest level in more than 15 years of monitoring, December 2025. (link)
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