Turkish tourism under pressure: how political tensions with Iran are affecting hotels, trade, and border economies
Turkey’s tourism industry, which achieved record results in 2024, is entering a more sensitive period in 2026, in which security risks, regional tensions, and changes in the behaviour of Iranian travellers are increasingly spilling over into local economies. This is especially visible in cities and regions that have for years depended heavily on Iranian guests, from Istanbul and Antalya to Van in the east of the country. There, Iranian demand has long been important not only for hotels and apartments but also for trade, restaurants, transport, short-term apartment rentals, and investments in real estate and small businesses.
In recent years, Iran has been one of the most important source markets for Turkey. According to data from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the number of Iranian visitors to Turkey grew from 2.5 million in 2023 to 3.27 million in 2024, showing how important that flow was for the overall picture of tourism and cross-border trade. At the same time, Turkey generated a record 61.1 billion U.S. dollars in tourism revenue in 2024 and hosted 62.2 million visitors, according to data from Turkish authorities and official statistics. That is precisely why any more visible weakening of Iranian demand may not immediately bring down national records, but it can very quickly hit individual neighbourhoods, cities, and sectors that had become used to a steady inflow of Iranian guests.
From strong growth to sudden uncertainty
At the beginning of 2025, the Iranian market for Turkey still looked exceptionally strong. According to data reported by the media citing the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Iran was among the leading sources of foreign guests in the first months of 2025, and in January and February it ranked at the very top by number of arrivals. This fit into a longer-term pattern: Iranians do not come to Turkey only in summer and do not spend only on a classic holiday, but also take advantage of proximity, the visa-free regime for tourist and business visits of up to 90 days, the purchase of consumer goods, medical services, short city stays, and seasonal stays in border provinces.
But during 2026, the picture began to change. In the background, political and security factors piled up: internal repression and mass arrests in Iran, restrictions on protests and increased monitoring of Iranian dissidents in Turkey, disruptions and instability at the border, and a broader regional security crisis. In such an atmosphere, some Iranian travellers no longer view Turkey exclusively as a nearby and practical destination for holidays and shopping, but also as a space of political discomfort, uncertainty, or temporary transit. It is precisely in this change in sentiment that what some media describe as an unofficial boycott, or at least a noticeable distancing by part of the Iranian diaspora and consumers from Turkey, is taking shape.
It is important here to distinguish between two things. On the one hand, Turkey remains accessible and logistically crucial for a large number of Iranians, especially because of the land border and the visa-free travel regime. On the other hand, accessibility in itself does not mean the same level of tourist spending. A traveller who crosses the border for safety, internet connectivity, waiting for relatives, or a short escape from crisis does not spend like a guest who comes for multi-day shopping, a summer holiday, or investment in real estate. For local economies, that difference is crucial.
Van as the first indicator of change
Perhaps nowhere is this shift as clearly visible as in Van, a city that for years was one of the most important points for Iranian visitors. The proximity of the border, a developed retail offer, and the habit of short weekend trips made Van almost a natural extension of the market on the Iranian side of the border. Hürriyet Daily News, citing earlier official data and local estimates, reported that Van hosted around 157 thousand Iranian visitors in the first quarter of 2025 and generated approximately 80 million dollars in revenue for the local economy. That says enough about how dependent a single city can become on one group of guests.
That is exactly why any disruption in that flow very quickly affects the wider service chain. When the number of Iranian visitors declines or when they stay for a shorter time and spend more cautiously, the drop is not felt only by hotels. It is felt by clothing and footwear stores, jewellery shops, cafés, restaurants, taxi drivers, travel agencies, small exchange offices, private landlords, and carriers operating on routes to border crossings. In border towns, the purchasing power of guests is often just as important as the number of entries itself, and it is precisely that spending that comes under the greatest pressure when the political situation turns travel from a free choice into a necessary or cautious decision.
Additional uncertainty was also introduced by measures at the border itself. At the beginning of March 2026, Turkish media reported that Turkey and Iran had mutually suspended same-day crossings at the border, while cargo traffic and regular crossings continued to function. Such a decision may not close the border completely, but it changes the rhythm of the border economy, which relies precisely on fast and frequent entries for shopping, services, and short stays. For cities such as Van, this is not an abstract geopolitical story but a direct blow to daily customer traffic.
Istanbul and Antalya: less sensitive, but not immune
Istanbul and Antalya have a broader and more diverse guest base than the eastern border provinces, so a drop in Iranian demand does not affect them in the same way. But that does not mean they are immune. Istanbul was Turkey’s most important entry and tourist point in 2024, and Antalya was the second major pillar of foreign arrivals. In these cities, Iranian guests are important not only because of their numbers but also because of the type of spending: city hotels, private accommodation, more upscale shopping, aesthetic and medical services, multi-day family stays, and ties with the business diaspora.
When part of that market slows down, the effect can be distributed across several niches. In Istanbul, this may mean lower occupancy in certain hotels and apartments in districts traditionally used by Iranian guests, slower sales in shopping centres, and fewer transactions in the small investment segment. In Antalya, the change may be less visible at the national level, but noticeable for hotels and agencies that specifically work with the Iranian market, especially outside the main season or in packages combining holidays, healthcare services, and shopping.
Turkey is still, however, a huge and diversified tourism market that can absorb part of the shock thanks to guests from Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Gulf countries, and other European markets. However, the problem for local entrepreneurs is not only the number of arrivals at the state level, but the loss of a market that was predictable, commercially active, and spatially concentrated. In tourism, precisely such markets often carry the greatest value because they fill accommodation outside peak weeks, return several times a year, and spend across a broad range of sectors.
The political dimension: why some Iranians no longer perceive Turkey in the same way
The informal distancing of some Iranians from Turkey cannot be understood without the political background. At the beginning of 2026, Turkish authorities prevented Iranian citizens from protesting in front of the Iranian consulate in Istanbul, as reported by AFP and several international media outlets. Shortly afterwards, the Committee to Protect Journalists warned about the case of Iranian journalist and refugee Kaveh Taheri, who was detained in Turkey amid fears of deportation. For part of the Iranian diaspora, such events send a political message that Turkey may no longer be the neutral or safe space they had previously perceived it to be.
At the same time, human rights organisations warned that the situation in Iran had further deteriorated during 2025 and 2026, with mass arrests, executions, and the suppression of protests. In such circumstances, the emotional logic of travel becomes different. Some people continue to come because they must, because of family, work, or escape from instability, but at the same time may decide that they will not spend as before, that they will not extend their stay, or that they will choose other countries for holidays and shopping. An unofficial boycott, even when not formally organised, often looks exactly like this in practice: fewer leisure trips, less impulsive spending, and more restraint towards the economy of a country perceived as politically problematic.
Because of this, the business impact does not necessarily manifest itself in one dramatic daily drop in statistics. Sometimes it is seen through quieter changes: shorter bookings, more cancellations, lower average spending per person, less purchasing of durable goods, a slowdown in apartment rentals, and a decline in demand for services that were previously strongly linked to Iranian guests. This is the kind of pressure that does not look spectacular in headlines, but is felt very clearly on the ground.
The border as an economic artery, but also a security point
Turkey and Iran have an important economic relationship and a long land border. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that bilateral merchandise trade reached around 5.68 billion dollars in 2024. Ankara and Tehran have repeatedly highlighted a more ambitious target of 30 billion dollars in trade exchange, but practice shows that political and security crises regularly slow such plans down. When supervision at the border is tightened, certain crossing regimes are restricted, or general uncertainty prevails, not only tourism suffers but also the broader local economy that lives from the movement of people and goods.
The regional security situation further increases the risk. In March 2026, the U.S. State Department warned of heightened security dangers in southeastern Turkey, and Van is among the provinces it lists. Although such warnings are not the only criterion for travellers from Iran, they further shape the perception of an area that for thousands of people was a symbol of quick shopping, a weekend break, or a family stay across the border. When a tourist region starts to be viewed through a security lens, the behaviour of guests almost always changes.
In addition, reports by AP and other media in 2026 show that some Iranians used the border with Turkey not because of tourism in the classic sense, but because of access to the internet, temporary safety, or waiting for developments in Iran. This is a flow that can increase the number of crossings, but may not bring the same economic benefit. For local entrepreneurs, the difference between a tourist and a person in transit is enormous: the former fills rooms and restaurants, the latter often only passes through.
Can Turkey replace the Iranian market
At the national level, Turkey has tools to mitigate the impact. The country remains one of the largest tourism powers in the Mediterranean, with strong air connectivity, powerful hotel capacities, and a broad spectrum of markets. If the loss of part of Iranian demand spills over only into certain months or regions, Ankara can partially compensate for it by relying more heavily on other markets. But that does not solve the problem of cities that for years have built a specific growth model precisely on Iranian guests.
This is especially important for places where Iranian arrivals were not a seasonal surplus, but an integral part of everyday life. In such environments, business models, goods inventories, pricing policy, commercial lease arrangements, and working hours were often adapted to the habits of Iranian buyers and travellers. When such a flow slows down, adaptation is not fast. A trader cannot overnight replace a customer who arrives by car across the border and spends on textiles, cosmetics, and household goods with a guest who arrives by air package to the coast and spends almost everything within a hotel complex.
That is why the real test for Turkish tourism and local economies will be the duration of this uncertainty. If political tensions ease, the border regime stabilises, and the confidence of Iranian travellers returns, the effect could remain limited to a shorter period. If, however, security risks, repression in Iran, and the perception that Turkey is no longer equally desirable or safe for part of the Iranian diaspora continue, the consequences will be deeper and more visible precisely where Iranian guests until yesterday were the most important part of local spending.
At this moment, therefore, the most important question is not whether Turkey will continue to achieve high tourism figures at the level of the whole country, but how costly the loss of the quality of one market that was close, frequent, and economically widely spread will be. For Istanbul and Antalya, this is a warning. For Van and similar border cities, this is already a very concrete business problem.
Sources:- - Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – overview of economic and trade relations with Iran, including the number of Iranian visitors in 2024 and merchandise trade data (link)
- - TÜİK / Directorate of Communications of the Republic of Türkiye – official data on the record 61.1 billion dollars in tourism revenue and 62.2 million visitors in 2024 (link)
- - Anadolu Agency – summary of official tourism statistics and revenue growth in 2024 (link)
- - Hürriyet Daily News – report on the planning of a new border crossing with Iran and data on the importance of Iranian visitors for Van, including a revenue estimate for the first quarter of 2025 (link)
- - Hürriyet Daily News – news report on the suspension of same-day crossings at the Turkish-Iranian border at the beginning of March 2026 (link)
- - Associated Press – report on the use of the border with Turkey because of internet blockades in Iran and the changing nature of travel in early 2026 (link)
- - Associated Press – report on the arrival of Iranians in Turkey during the regional crisis and a reminder of the visa-free regime for up to 90 days (link)
- - Committee to Protect Journalists – warning about the detention of Iranian journalist Kaveh Taheri in Turkey and fears of deportation (link)
- - AFP / international media – reports on the ban on protests by Iranian citizens outside the consulate in Istanbul in January 2026 (link)
- - Human Rights Watch – overview of the human rights situation in Iran and the worsening repression during 2025 and 2026 (link)
- - U.S. Department of State – security warning for southeastern Turkey, including Van, published in March 2026 (link)
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