EL AL’s return to an almost full pace opens a bigger question: is the conflict really calming down, or is air traffic simply getting used to a higher level of risk?
At first glance, the decision by Israel’s national carrier EL AL to begin restoring its flight network to an almost regular rhythm after disruptions lasting several days and several weeks appears to be encouraging news for passengers, tourism, and business travel. Yet behind that decision stands a far more complex picture. In a region where war, airspace restrictions, security warnings, political negotiations, and energy shocks have overlapped in recent weeks, the return of flights does not automatically mean the return of stability. On the contrary, precisely because air traffic is being restored while the political framework remains fragile, EL AL’s move opens an uncomfortable but important question: does this shift indicate a genuine easing of Israeli-Iranian tensions, or rather that part of the industry is accepting doing business in a world of permanently elevated risk?
Judging by the information currently available, the answer is not unequivocal. On the one hand, Israeli authorities announced the reopening of the airspace and the return of regular operations at Ben Gurion Airport, after which EL AL announced a gradual expansion of operations, with approximately 30 destinations as early as next week and a plan for further expansion during the month. On the other hand, the European and international security regulatory framework did not disappear overnight. Conflict-zone warnings remained in force, and a large number of foreign carriers still show no readiness for a rapid return to the Israeli market. That is why EL AL’s return is not only a story about the restoration of traffic, but also about the difference between a political signal, business necessity, and the real sense of safety in air transport.
What EL AL has actually announced
The company’s own official information shows that this is not a single sudden jump back to full normality, but rather a phased return to the regular flight schedule. After earlier flight cancellations and operating in an emergency mode, EL AL announced that, in line with the guidelines of the Israeli authorities and following the restoration of air operations, it plans to gradually increase the scope of its network. The company states that the number of destinations will rise to around 30 next week, with the intention of reaching a full return to operations across the entire network during the month. That is an important distinction: the market has been sent a message of return, but the company itself is still speaking about a controlled and gradual process, not about complete and immediate normalization.
Such wording is not accidental. Airlines rarely speak publicly about risk in the way security agencies or military analysts do, but the choice of words in their statements usually says a great deal. When a carrier states that it is expanding operations gradually, to the “broadest extent possible,” this usually means that it is still operating with a series of constraints: from the availability of crews and aircraft, through the coordination of slots and routes, to security assessments that can literally change overnight. In other words, even an optimistic announcement leaves enough room for sudden corrections if the security picture worsens.
The reopening of Ben Gurion is an important signal, but not final proof of stabilization
Israel’s Ministry of Transport announced that Ben Gurion Airport is returning to full operations after the announcement of a ceasefire between the United States and Iran, and that was precisely the formal framework that enabled a stronger expansion of commercial flights. For Israel, Ben Gurion is far more than an ordinary international airport: it is the main channel for passenger traffic, business ties, the arrival of the diaspora, tourism, but also for the psychological sense of the country’s connection with the rest of the world. When access to that airport is restricted, the message is not only logistical, but also political and social.
Still, an open airport is not the same as fully stable skies. The restoration of airport operations shows that the authorities have assessed that there is a sufficient minimum of safety to continue traffic, but that does not mean that strategic risks have disappeared. Even after the reopening was announced, the European regulator EASA maintained warnings for the airspace of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and emphasized that operators must carry out up-to-date monitoring of developments and robust risk assessments if they intend to fly in affected or neighboring areas. In practice, this means that regulatory logic and commercial logic do not have to be fully aligned: the state may want traffic to resume, the national carrier may want to restore the network, but every individual flight still remains subject to an assessment that can be changed by new intelligence, military, or operational data.
The fragile ceasefire changed the tone, but did not remove uncertainty
An important part of the broader picture is the fact that the restoration of traffic took place after a two-week ceasefire that the United States and Iran accepted at the beginning of April, along with the announcement of talks in Islamabad and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. In aviation terms, this was crucial because the market received at least a temporary signal that the worst phase of immediate escalation might be easing. When even a limited diplomatic framework appears in a region with major military activity, carriers, insurers, leasing companies, and regulatory bodies immediately redraw their risk maps.
But that pause proved very fragile. According to the latest information, the talks between Washington and Tehran ended without an agreement, and new questions have been opened about what follows when the current ceasefire expires on April 22. This dramatically changes the interpretation of EL AL’s expansion. Had the diplomatic process progressed, the return of flights could have been read as the first sign of broader regional normalization. Since the negotiations have so far produced no result, the same decision can also be viewed differently: as a business and strategic move by a company assessing that it cannot remain in emergency mode for too long, even in an environment where the political outcome has not yet been secured.
Why EL AL can return faster than foreign carriers
This is precisely where EL AL’s special position comes to the fore. As Israel’s national carrier, the company has a different operational and political profile from most foreign airlines. It does not merely sell tickets, but in times of crisis becomes part of the national infrastructure. That was visible in previous crises, and it is visible again now: while foreign companies delay their return because of security assessments, insurance restrictions, reputational risk, or simple business calculations, the domestic carrier has a stronger incentive to remain present and to expand capacity again as soon as there is institutional room to do so.
That position, however, has two sides. On the one hand, EL AL thereby strengthens its market position at a moment when the competition is thinned out or temporarily absent. On the other hand, precisely for that reason the company also takes on a greater burden of public expectations: that it maintain the country’s connection with the outside world, take on part of the repatriation and crisis burden, but also show that it is not exploiting extraordinary circumstances. This also contains one of the key political-economic tensions of the entire story: when the market narrows because of war and security risks, the national carrier can simultaneously appear as the savior of the system and as the biggest beneficiary of the crisis.
The caution of foreign companies shows that “normal” is not yet a universal assessment
The best proof that EL AL’s return does not mean a general return of confidence is the behavior of other carriers. Several major companies have still maintained or extended suspensions of flights to Tel Aviv and the wider region. According to publicly available information, United Airlines suspended flights until September 7, Delta until September 5, Air Canada also until September 7, while the Lufthansa Group and several European carriers maintained suspensions at least until the end of April or the end of May. British Airways announced a return to Tel Aviv only on July 1, and even then with reduced frequency, openly acknowledging that uncertainty around the regional airspace continues to shape planning.
That is an important signal because it shows that the market does not share a single assessment of the situation. For the Israeli authorities and EL AL, conditions are evidently good enough for a gradual expansion of traffic. For many foreign carriers, the same region is still too unpredictable to justify an earlier return, especially on long-haul routes and in complex network systems where one disruption has a chain effect on crews, connections, and aircraft scheduling. In translation, “normal” at this moment does not mean the same thing for everyone: for some it means the reopening of the runway and terminal, and for others the return of predictability, which the region still does not have.
War affects not only routes, but the entire economics of flying
Aviation does not react only to missiles and closed air corridors. It reacts just as strongly to the price of fuel, insurance, the availability of alternative routes, and flight time. Back in March, IATA warned that the escalation in the Middle East had severely hit global energy flows and exposed the vulnerability of jet fuel supply, particularly because of disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz. When such a geopolitical shock spills over into fuel prices and availability, the consequences do not stop in the directly affected countries. They hit carriers’ networks in Europe, Asia, and North America, raise costs, disrupt planning, and increase pressure on ticket prices.
In that context, the decision of a single company to restore part of its flights is no longer just a security question. It is also a calculation of how long it can endure the emergency regime without more serious market and financial consequences. EL AL is no exception here. If foreign companies remain absent for a longer period, the domestic carrier may increase its market share, but at the same time it also bears higher operating costs, political pressure, and reputational risk if it turns out that the return was announced too early or if a new sudden escalation occurs.
IATA and EASA warn that in such circumstances planning is done day by day
In recent years, the international aviation industry has spoken increasingly openly about the world entering a period in which conflict zones are no longer a marginal phenomenon, but a permanent operational fact. In its safety guidance, IATA warns that military action in the Middle East causes constant disruptions, airspace closures, temporary or prolonged airport closures, rapidly changing regulatory conditions, and great uncertainty in planning. EASA at the same time stresses that operators must have a robust process for monitoring and updating risk assessments. That may sound technical, but the message is very simple: in conditions like these, there is no stable “new routine” that can be planned months in advance without hesitation.
That is precisely why EL AL’s return to an almost full pace should be read with caution. It is not proof that the danger of war has disappeared, but that the company has assessed that, with the existing measures, state coordination, and the current operational framework, it is possible to fly more than in previous days. That is a major difference. The return of a larger number of flights is indeed a concrete and important fact, but it is not a political confirmation of lasting stabilization. In the worst-case scenario, the schedule can be reduced again just as quickly as it was expanded.
What this decision says about the region, and what it says about the industry
At a deeper level, EL AL’s decision shows how the relationship between war and civil air traffic has changed. The logic used to be simpler: when war escalates, aircraft leave, and they return only when diplomatic and security conditions are clearly stabilized. Today the picture is murkier. Companies, states, and regulators increasingly operate in gray zones between open conflict and a limited ceasefire, between partially open skies and permanent warnings, between economic pressure and security caution. EL AL is now operating precisely in that gray zone.
That, however, does not mean that the company is irresponsible or that the market is behaving irrationally. Rather, it means that the threshold of what is considered “operable” has risen. In a world where conflicts last longer, borders are increasingly porous, and geopolitics spills directly into energy, insurance, and logistics, airlines are under pressure to find a way to operate even where they once would simply have drawn a line. That is precisely why the question in the title of this story remains open: it is not only about whether tensions are easing, but also about whether global aviation is becoming accustomed to the idea that higher risk will be a permanent part of the business environment.
If negotiations between Washington and Tehran are nevertheless resumed and grow into a more sustainable arrangement, EL AL’s current expansion could in retrospect look like the first rational step toward a broader regional recovery. If, however, the current ceasefire remains only a short pause before new instability, the same move will be remembered as an illustration of a time in which “a return to normal” is no longer measured by the disappearance of danger, but by the willingness to fly despite it.
Sources:- EL AL – official operational notice on the gradual expansion of the flight network and the plan to return toward full operations (link)- Israeli Transport Ministry / Reuters – information on the return of full operations at Ben Gurion Airport after the announcement of a ceasefire (link)- Associated Press – report on the two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran and the announcement of talks in Islamabad (link)- Associated Press – report on the failed talks and the uncertainty surrounding the expiry of the current ceasefire on April 22 (link)- EASA – Conflict Zone Information Bulletin for the airspace of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, with an emphasis on continuous monitoring and risk assessment (link)- IATA – guidance for risk assessment in airspace with militarized threats (link)- IATA – document on the effects of military action in the Middle East, airspace closures, and operational uncertainty (link)- IATA – analysis of the impact of escalation in the Middle East on jet fuel supply and broader industry costs (link)- Reuters / TradeArabia – British Airways announcement of a return to Tel Aviv only from July 1 and with reduced frequency (link)- Ynet – overview of extended flight suspensions by several foreign carriers for Tel Aviv, including United, Delta, Air Canada, and the Lufthansa Group (link)
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