Fertilizers and food are entering a zone of new global pressure
Growing nervousness in the global fertilizer market is no longer just a narrow industrial topic reserved for chemical producers, distributors, and agricultural exchanges. In the first months of 2026, it is becoming increasingly clear that the issue of fertilizer supply and prices is once again turning into a broader economic story, one that directly affects agricultural production, food costs, trade flows, and social stability in parts of the world already burdened by inflation, climate extremes, and weaker public finances. Behind this pressure lies a well-known connection: when energy and key inputs are expensive, the production of mineral fertilizers also becomes expensive, and when fertilizers become less affordable for farmers, part of the blow later reaches store shelves and household consumer budgets.
Although the global market today does not look the same as it did during the most tense phases of the energy and food crisis in 2022, a series of indicators suggests that old risks are returning in a new form. The World Bank announced at the beginning of March that fertilizer prices in February 2026 rose by 6.5 percent month on month, while food prices rose by 2.1 percent. At the same time, the FAO records that the global food price index rose again in February for the first time after five consecutive monthly declines, with cereal, meat, and vegetable oil prices rising in particular. This in itself does not mean that the world is facing a new food crisis of the same intensity as a few years ago, but it does mean that the chain linking energy, fertilizers, crops, and food is once again under scrutiny.
Why fertilizers are once again at the center of attention
Fertilizers are one of the most sensitive points in global agriculture because they connect three areas that are unstable at the same time: energy, geopolitical trade, and food production. Nitrogen fertilizers are particularly tied to the price of natural gas, which is crucial for the production of ammonia, the basic raw material for a range of fertilizer products. Phosphate and potash fertilizers depend on other mining and logistics chains, but they too remain exposed to disruptions in exports, sanctions, tariffs, and changes in global demand.
Because of this, the fertilizer market cannot be viewed only through the question of whether there is enough product. It is equally important at what price the goods reach farmers and how bearable that cost is in relation to the price of cereals, oilseeds, and other crops that the farmer sells. This is precisely where the biggest problem lies now. The World Bank warns that fertilizer prices in late 2025 did partially ease after the previous surge, but remained elevated, around 17 percent above the level of a year earlier. At the same time, affordability remains weak because food prices and some agricultural commodity prices are lower or stagnating, so producers find it harder to finance the necessary inputs with the same income.
In other words, the market may formally be supplied while a crisis still exists at the economic level. It then becomes visible in reduced fertilization, postponed purchases, lower use of more expensive formulations, and greater pressure on yields in the seasons ahead. This is one of the reasons why expert institutions in recent months have increasingly focused not only on quantities on the market, but also on the relationship between fertilizer prices and crop prices, that is, on the real ability of farmers to sustain production.
Energy remains the key cost trigger
The connection between energy and fertilizers is old, but it remains crucial. When the price of natural gas rises or becomes unstable, producers of nitrogen fertilizers very quickly feel the hit to costs, and part of that hit is passed on to wholesale and export prices. In its market analyses, the FAO points out that a more stable gas price during 2024 contributed to greater predictability in production, especially in Europe, where better gas affordability led to the recovery of part of production. However, that does not mean that the structural vulnerability has disappeared. A few months of more expensive energy, a logistical bottleneck, or a trade restriction are enough to upset the balance again.
This is why the World Bank also maintains a cautious assessment for 2026. According to its analysis, fertilizer prices should gradually ease as new production facilities enter the market, but remain above the average from the 2015 to 2019 period. The main upside risks remain the same: higher input costs, above all natural gas, and the continuation of export restrictions. This means that agriculture and the food chain continue to depend on developments that are not formed in the fields, but on energy markets, in government offices, and on global trade routes.
For the consumer, this matters because food does not become more expensive only when the harvest fails. Price increases can also build earlier, while crops are still in production, through more expensive fertilizer, more expensive transport, and higher financial costs. In such a situation, even if overall world commodity prices weaken nominally, individual food categories may rise because of specific regional disruptions or higher production costs.
Trade restrictions and geopolitics are changing the flow of goods
In today’s fertilizer market, not only production is decisive, but also the question of who is allowed to sell to whom, under what conditions, and through which transport routes. Over the last year, the role of China has stood out in particular, which according to the World Bank’s analysis strongly restricted exports of nitrogen fertilizers in order to protect domestic price and supply stability. In 2024, Chinese exports in that segment fell by more than 90 percent year on year, and the restrictions were also felt during the first half of 2025. Such a decision does not necessarily create a global physical shortage, but it narrows the market, raises uncertainty, and increases the dependence of other importers on smaller groups of suppliers.
In addition, further changes are coming from Europe. The Council of the European Union adopted in 2025 new tariffs on the remaining agricultural products and part of the fertilizers from Russia and Belarus, with the measures on fertilizers applying to certain nitrogen products. Brussels emphasized two goals in doing so: reducing the European Union’s dependence on those imports and encouraging diversification of supply as well as domestic production. But every such measure, regardless of its political motive and strategic logic, changes trade flows in the short term and can increase procurement costs where alternative supply routes are not yet sufficiently developed.
The European Commission stated that the new regime has applied since 1 July 2025, with an additional tariff layer and a gradual increase in duties on certain fertilizers during the transition period. This means that part of the goods that previously went to the European market will seek other buyers, primarily in Asia and the Americas, while European importers will simultaneously seek replacement sources. Such a redistribution does not automatically have to lead to a global shortage, but it intensifies friction in a system that was already full of geopolitical uncertainty.
More production does not automatically mean less risk
At first glance, one might conclude that there is no reason for alarm, because some of the production data are actually more favorable than a year or two ago. The International Fertilizer Association states that 2024 was a strong year for the production of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash. Global ammonia production is estimated at 190.5 million tonnes, which is three percent more than a year earlier, while urea production rose to 201 million tonnes. The production of phosphate and potash products also grew, and in Europe, thanks to more favorable gas prices, part of production recovered.
Nevertheless, the same sources warn that serious regional differences lie behind those aggregates. Some countries benefit from new capacities, state support, or a more favorable relationship between fertilizer prices and crop prices, while others remain under pressure from weak affordability. Latin America, for example, saw a decline in part of production because of gas problems and plant closures, while supply and energy problems were also recorded in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This shows that the global average can conceal the fact that certain regions remain vulnerable.
It is precisely this combination of increased production and persistent vulnerability that is why the market is described as tight, not collapsed. There is more product than in the worst phases of the previous crisis, but the distribution of supply, input costs, and political restrictions make the system sensitive to a new shock. If climate risk is added to that, such as drought, frost, or disruptions to the harvest, then even a relatively small disruption on the input side can have a greater effect on food prices than the production data alone would suggest.
Food is not yet in a price explosion, but pressure is growing
In March 2026, the world is not in a situation of general panic in food markets, but a series of indicators shows that pressure is once again increasing. The FAO food price index for February stood at 125.3 points, which is 0.9 percent more than in January. The increase was led by cereals, meat, and vegetable oils. It is especially important that cereal prices rose also because of weather risks in Europe and the United States, but also because of logistical disruptions and continuing tensions in the Black Sea region. In vegetable oils, the increase was driven by strong import demand and seasonally lower production in Southeast Asia.
This shows that food never becomes more expensive for just one reason. Fertilizers are an important part of the story, but the final price is also affected by weather, transport routes, wars, exchange rates, biofuel policy, and domestic fiscal conditions. Still, more expensive inputs increase the likelihood that the pressure will persist longer, especially if producers judge that they cannot maintain previous investment levels without passing the cost on to purchase or retail prices.
The World Bank also warns of an additional nuance: even when overall food prices at the global level fall or stabilize, that does not automatically reduce acute food supply insecurity. The reason is simple. In many poorer countries, the problem is not only the level of the global price, but the combination of domestic inflation, weak currencies, expensive imports, and local crises. That is why an international decline in prices does not necessarily mean cheaper food for the poorest.
The greatest burden is borne by poorer and import-dependent countries
It is precisely here that the fertilizer issue very quickly expands from an industrial topic into a global economic and social story. UN Trade and Development warns that net food importers among developing countries spent almost two billion U.S. dollars on fertilizers in 2023 alone. At the same time, prices of numerous agricultural crops were falling, while some fertilizers remained significantly above pre-pandemic levels. Such an imbalance particularly affects small farmers, who have little room to maneuver, weaker access to credit, and greater exposure to exchange-rate changes.
When a small producer reduces fertilization because they cannot finance the required quantity, the consequence is not only a lower yield in one season. In the long run, the risk of weaker local supply, greater dependence on imports, and additional food price growth on the domestic market increases. In countries that already have a high share of food spending in household budgets, this very quickly becomes a social and political issue. That is why international organizations in recent months have strongly emphasized that the problem is not only the physical availability of food, but also people’s ability to buy that food.
In its report on the state of food security and nutrition, the FAO warns that elevated food price inflation particularly affects lower-income households, women, and rural communities, and that it is associated with the growth of food supply insecurity and child malnutrition. At the same time, in its appeal for 2026, the FAO points out that acute food insecurity has nearly tripled since 2016 to almost 300 million people, while financing for the humanitarian response is not keeping pace with the growth in needs. Within such a framework, every new rise in fertilizer costs becomes more than an agricultural issue: it intensifies existing humanitarian and development weaknesses.
Humanitarian and development risks are becoming the same problem
Data from the World Food Programme further reinforce the picture. The WFP estimates that in 2026, 318 million people will face crisis levels of hunger or worse, more than double compared with 2019. At the same time, the agency warns of a funding shortfall and of the need to direct aid to the most vulnerable. This means that the global system is facing double pressure: needs are growing, and resources are not unlimited. In such a situation, investment in domestic agricultural production and the resilience of local systems becomes more important than short-term food procurement on the international market alone.
The FAO therefore especially emphasizes that every dollar invested in production in the field creates three dollars of local food value on average, while up to 80 percent of acutely food-insecure people live in rural areas, and only a small part of relevant financing goes precisely to food production. The message is clear: if fertilizers become too expensive and unavailable to the most vulnerable farmers, the cost later returns through a greater need for humanitarian aid, more expensive imports, and a deeper food crisis.
In other words, the fertilizer issue today is not only a question of market efficiency, but also a question of development policy. Countries that have enough fiscal space can mitigate part of the blow with subsidies, lending programs, or strategic securing of inputs. Poorer countries generally do not have such room. That is why the global gap is widening precisely where food security is otherwise the most fragile.
What follows for producers, traders, and consumers
The most realistic scenario for the rest of 2026 at the moment is not a complete collapse of supply, but rather a prolonged period of sensitivity. If energy remains expensive or again fluctuates strongly, fertilizer producers will face an additional cost shock. If trade restrictions continue, especially on nitrogen and phosphate products, part of the market will remain tight despite new capacities. If, in addition, poorer weather occurs in key agricultural regions, the pressure could more easily spill over into broader food categories.
For food producers, this means less room for planning and greater caution when purchasing inputs. For traders and processors, it means more expensive inventory management and greater exposure to price spikes. For consumers, this does not necessarily have to mean an immediate sharp increase in all store bills, but it does mean that the risk of a new wave of price increases is still present, especially in segments sensitive to cereals, oils, animal feed, and international transport.
It is especially important that today’s global pressure does not have a single center. It is being built from several directions at the same time: from energy, geopolitical decisions, changes in trade routes, climate extremes, and weaker affordability for farmers. That is precisely why the fertilizer and food market is once again entering a zone of serious monitoring. It is not only about how much one tonne of urea or DAP will cost, but about how resilient agricultural and food systems are in a world that remains exposed to sudden shocks. In that equation, the weakest will, as usual, feel the consequences first, while the wealthier may see them somewhat later, but will hardly be able to avoid them completely.
Sources:- FAO – overview of the FAO food price index for February 2026 with data on rising cereal, meat, and vegetable oil prices (link)- World Bank – Commodity Markets page with the release of data for March 2026 and an overview of fertilizer and food price movements (link)- World Bank Data Blog – analysis of the fertilizer market from December 2025 on prices, affordability, Chinese export restrictions, and risks for 2026 and 2027 (link)- International Fertilizer Association – summary of the medium-term outlook for the fertilizer market 2025–2029 with data on the production of ammonia, urea, phosphate, and potash (link)- Council of the European Union – decision on new tariffs on certain agricultural products and fertilizers from Russia and Belarus (link)- European Commission / Access2Markets – clarification of the application of the new tariffs from 1 July 2025 and the coverage of nitrogen fertilizers (link)- UN Trade and Development – analysis of trade measures, acute food insecurity, and fertilizer costs for developing countries (link)- FAO – The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025, with an emphasis on food price inflation and its effect on vulnerable groups (link)- FAO – Global Emergency and Resilience Appeal 2026, with data on the growth of acute food insecurity and the need to invest in agricultural production (link)- World Food Programme – Global Outlook 2026 and an estimate of the number of people facing crisis levels of hunger (link)
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