Gaza remains a political flashpoint despite the formal ceasefire
Although the ceasefire in Gaza has been formally in force since 10 October 2025, developments in March 2026 show how unstable, limited and politically uncertain that lull still is. New Israeli strikes, the continuation of deaths on the ground, and the announcement of only a partial and strictly controlled reopening of the Rafah crossing confirm that Gaza has not turned into a post-war space of recovery, but into a field in which a security, humanitarian and political battle is being fought at the same time. In such circumstances, the issue is no longer only whether the ceasefire can be maintained, but also a much harder question: who will, under what conditions and with whose legitimacy, govern Gaza at all after the war.
The latest events further highlight that contradiction. According to data published on 15 and 16 March by hospital sources and international media, at least 12 Palestinians were killed in new Israeli strikes in the central part of Gaza, including children, a pregnant woman and eight police officers. For years, the Israeli side has insisted that it acts against threats and against people it considers linked to militant structures, while Palestinian sources warn that this continues the pattern of strikes even during the period of a formal ceasefire. The very fact that new casualties are recorded almost daily even after a months-long halt to major operations shows that Gaza remains an active crisis area, not a stabilised post-war environment.
The ceasefire exists, but the violence has not disappeared
The problem now is no longer only the intensity of the conflict, but its form. Large-scale ground operations and the mass bombing that marked the previous phases of the war are not occurring to the same extent as before, but the area has remained deeply militarised, fragmented and politically undefined. According to data reported by the Associated Press, citing health authorities in Gaza, more than 650 Palestinians have been killed since the start of the ceasefire, while the Israeli army claims that it is responding to violations of the agreement or acting against wanted operatives. This creates a situation in which both sides formally speak of a ceasefire, but on the ground there is still a reality of regular strikes, gunfire near military zones and constant danger for civilians.
That gap between diplomatic language and the actual situation on the ground is particularly important for understanding Gaza’s political weight. When a ceasefire does not bring clear security to the population, it automatically ceases to be only a military arrangement and becomes a test of the broader political order. In that sense, every new death, every closed crossing and every delayed medical evacuation are no longer just humanitarian episodes, but elements of an international dispute over responsibility, oversight and the future governance of the territory. Gaza therefore remains a subject that cannot be reduced only to the number of incidents, because behind each of them lies the question of who truly controls the processes of life in that space.
Rafah as a symbol of more than an ordinary border crossing
The Rafah crossing has long ceased to be only a logistical point between Gaza and Egypt, and has become a political symbol of sovereignty, control and humanitarian access. Its limited opening at the beginning of February 2026 was presented as an important step in implementing the ceasefire plan. The European Union, through the EUBAM Rafah mission, then confirmed that on 2 February the crossing had been reopened for a controlled number of passengers in both directions, emphasising that this primarily concerned the sick, the wounded and other priority cases. In this way, Rafah was, at least briefly, restored to its function as a kind of humanitarian lifeline for a population that has been living for months with a collapsed health system and limited ability to leave the Strip.
But that shift proved fragile almost as quickly as the ceasefire itself. The World Health Organization announced that medical evacuations through the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings have been suspended since 28 February 2026, after a new regional escalation. In the same report, the WHO states that more than 18,500 patients in Gaza still urgently need medical care that is not available to them locally, while Palestinian health authorities also speak of more than 20,000 people in need of medical evacuation. This means that the discussion about Rafah is not only a matter of border procedure, but literally a matter of access to treatment, survival and the possibility for the most serious cases to reach a hospital outside Gaza at all.
Israel’s announcement that the crossing should reopen on Wednesday, 18 March 2026, but only for limited passenger traffic and without the passage of cargo, shows that even now there is no talk of full normalisation. This is a partial reopening, under strict security control and without a solution for the broader movement of goods, reconstruction and regular civilian life. That is precisely why Rafah remains one of the most sensitive points of the entire conflict: it simultaneously represents a border, a security filter, a humanitarian corridor and a lever of political influence over Gaza’s future.
The humanitarian crisis remains at the centre of the political dispute
In many previous phases of the conflict, humanitarian issues were treated as a consequence of war. Today they are at the centre of the political debate itself. When the crossing is closed, when patients cannot leave, when fuel does not enter, and health teams cannot rotate staff, this is no longer only a side effect of the conflict, but an instrument that determines the real balance of power on the ground. At the beginning of March, the WHO warned that because of the closure of the crossings and supply disruptions, health services remain under threat, including supplies of fuel, medicines and laboratory material. In conditions in which hospitals and emergency services are already operating on the edge of sustainability, every new interruption in supplies or evacuations further deepens the population’s insecurity.
In its reports, OCHA stressed that air strikes, shelling and gunfire continued at the beginning of March, and that the Rafah and Zikim crossings remained closed. In earlier reports from February, the same agency stated that the limited reopening of Rafah allowed only a very limited number of medical evacuations and the passage of accompanying persons. In other words, even when access is partially restored, it is far from the level that would match the actual needs on the ground. That is why the humanitarian crisis in Gaza cannot be viewed only as the number of trucks or patients, but as an indicator of how unfinished the political architecture of the ceasefire has remained.
It is especially important that humanitarian access is not separated from the question of legitimate authority. Who manages the crossing, who approves the departure of patients, who supervises passenger lists, who coordinates international missions and who guarantees security within the Strip – all these are questions that directly determine the political model of future Gaza. Because of this, every standstill at Rafah has a broader meaning than the border regime itself. It immediately becomes proof either of the failure of the ceasefire, or of the limitations of international oversight, or of the fact that the post-war order has still not been established.
Who will govern Gaza after the war
It is precisely here that the most difficult political question opens up: who is acceptable as the authority in Gaza after the war and under what conditions. The United States, some Western allies and some regional actors have in recent months been pushing different models of transitional administration, international oversight and security stabilisation. In November 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, which supported a broader plan to end the conflict, establish a temporary international stabilisation presence and later transfer governance to a reformed Palestinian Authority. On paper, that framework suggests a transition from war to institutional recovery. In practice, however, a serious gap still exists between the diplomatic plan and the reality on the ground.
One reason for this is the fact that Hamas has not disappeared as a political and security factor in Gaza, despite enormous military losses and the destruction of infrastructure. In recent days, the AP has reported that police structures linked to the authorities in Gaza have reappeared in parts of the territory that are not under direct Israeli military control. That does not mean a restoration of full governing capacity, but it does mean that the vacuum of power has not been filled by a new, stable and broadly accepted model. As long as such a vacuum exists, every discussion of a transitional administration remains limited because it collides with local power relations, Israel’s security interests and deep distrust of external solutions.
On the other hand, the Palestinian Authority and some Arab states continue to advocate a solution in which Gaza would not be separated from the broader Palestinian political whole. Egypt already in 2025 promoted a plan for the reconstruction and development of Gaza based on Palestinian ownership of the reconstruction process and the rejection of the forced displacement of the population. That approach aligns with the long-standing position of a large part of the international community that Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, must remain linked within the framework of future Palestinian statehood. But between that principle and its implementation stand the security conditions on the ground, the conflicting interests of the great powers, and the question of who can take power at all without a new wave of intra-Palestinian conflict.
Why every security decision is immediately also a diplomatic decision
The case of Gaza today shows that there are now almost no purely military or purely humanitarian moves left. The limited opening of a crossing is immediately interpreted as a political message. A new strike immediately becomes a diplomatic problem. Every discussion about the police, civil administration, aid delivery or medical evacuations is automatically transformed into a discussion about who has the mandate, who has the legitimacy and who sets the rules of the game. This is the key reason why Gaza remains a global political flashpoint despite the formal ceasefire.
Additional weight is given by the broader regional context. The escalation that began on 28 February 2026 directly affected humanitarian and medical channels to Gaza, as confirmed by the WHO and other international actors. In other words, Gaza remains so connected to the regional security picture that even events outside the Strip itself immediately change the conditions of life within it. This further complicates any serious reconstruction strategy, because it is difficult to build a lasting political model in a place where external shocks instantly close crossings, block evacuations and halt an already limited recovery.
That is precisely why today’s discussion about Gaza is no longer only a matter of stopping the shooting. It includes the issue of border control, rebuilding hospitals, the return of the displaced, the future status of armed groups, the role of the Palestinian Authority, the presence of international missions and the relationship between Israeli security demands and the Palestinian right to political self-government. All of this makes Gaza one of the most sensitive tests of international diplomacy in 2026. The formal ceasefire therefore does not mean that the political story is over; on the contrary, its hardest part is only just beginning, the part in which it will be decided whether Gaza will remain a permanent zone of managed instability or receive a framework in which humanitarian survival will no longer depend on every new security shock.
Sources:- Associated Press – report on Israeli strikes of 16 March 2026, new casualties in Gaza, continued deaths despite the ceasefire, and the announcement of the limited reopening of the Rafah crossing (link)
- WHO – Flash Update of 4 March 2026 on the suspension of medical evacuations through Rafah and Kerem Shalom and on more than 18,500 patients urgently needing care outside Gaza (link)
- OCHA – Humanitarian Situation Report of 6 March 2026 on the continuation of strikes, gunfire and the closure of the Rafah and Zikim crossings at the beginning of March (link)
- OCHA – Situation Reports No. 65 and 66 on the limited reopening of Rafah at the beginning of February 2026 and the medical evacuations that followed (link; link)
- EEAS / EUBAM Rafah – official European Union announcements on the reopening of the crossing on 2 February 2026 and the role of the European mission in supervising controlled passenger traffic (link; link)
- UN Security Council – Resolution 2803 (2025) and accompanying discussions on an international stabilisation presence, transitional administration and the future transfer of governance to a reformed Palestinian Authority (link; link)
- Egyptian Gaza reconstruction plan – document on the recovery, reconstruction and development of Gaza with an emphasis on Palestinian governance and the rejection of forced displacement (link)
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