Gaza remains the political epicentre as aid weakens, crossings tighten, and reconstruction depends on who will govern the enclave

Gaza remains the political epicentre as the Middle East shakes again: aid weakens, crossings tighten, and reconstruction hangs on the question of who will govern the enclave

Gaza remained the central political issue of the Middle East in March 2026 as well, even though the security crisis in recent weeks spilled over onto several regional fronts. While part of the international public’s attention shifted towards the broader escalation in the Israel–Iran axis and its consequences for Lebanon, Syria and maritime routes, in the Gaza Strip the practical consequences were felt almost immediately: humanitarian flows weakened further, the border regime was tightened again, medical evacuations were halted, and the already fragile plans for early recovery and reconstruction entered a new phase of uncertainty.

That is why Gaza today is no longer only a humanitarian tragedy nor only a ceasefire issue. At the same time, it is a security, diplomatic and financial test for the entire region. It is no longer disputed only how to stop the fighting, but also who can govern the territory after the war, under what conditions reconstruction money can enter, who will supervise the crossings, and whether a political arrangement acceptable to Israel, the Palestinians, Arab states and the main international donors can exist at all. It is precisely at this junction that both humanitarian aid and every serious idea of stabilising life for more than two million inhabitants of the enclave break down.

A new regional blow to an already devastated area

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the regional escalation at the beginning of March had immediate consequences for civilians in the occupied Palestinian territory. In Gaza, the closure of the crossings and additional security restrictions were accompanied by the suspension of coordination of humanitarian movements, medical evacuations, the return of residents from abroad, and the rotation of humanitarian personnel. In practice, this means that even the little logistical predictability that had begun to return after earlier de-escalation arrangements collapsed again within a few days.

Such a development particularly affects a territory whose everyday life has long been shaped by dependence on external corridors. Gaza does not have the luxury of absorbing even a short-term interruption in supplies without dramatic consequences for food prices, the operation of hospitals, water supply, the functioning of bakeries and the distribution of shelter materials. That is why every new restriction at Gaza’s crossings does not turn only into an administrative or security problem, but into a chain destabilisation of the entire civilian life. When the entries for fuel, medicines, spare parts and commercial goods are closed, the consequences are measured not only by truck statistics, but by the number of meals, operations and hours of electricity in the facilities that are still operating.

Crossings as a lever of control, not only logistics

At the beginning of March, the Israeli authorities closed the crossings to Gaza, which according to UN data led to the interruption of the entry of aid, fuel and commercial supplies and to the suspension of several forms of coordinated movement. Subsequently, a gradual reopening was announced for the Kerem Shalom crossing for the entry of part of the humanitarian aid and the rotation of international personnel, but the restrictions did not disappear; rather, they turned into a regime of reduced and strictly controlled throughput. At the same time, limited movement of people had earlier this year been allowed at the Rafah crossing, but even that did not change the fact that the overall passage system remained unstable and politically conditioned.

This is precisely what is crucial for understanding the current moment. Whoever controls the crossings largely controls the rhythm of life in Gaza. Crossings are not merely a technical point of entry for goods, but also an instrument of security oversight, political pressure and bargaining power. That is why the issue of reconstruction cannot be separated from the issue of access. Donors may announce billions, international organisations may prepare plans, and contractors may draw up phases of remediation, but without a stable and predictable regime for the entry of people and materials, even early recovery cannot move from paper into reality.

An additional problem is that humanitarian organisations have for some time been warning that the obstacle is not only the quantity of aid, but also the structure of the permitted intake. In Gaza, numerous pieces of equipment for healthcare and civilian infrastructure are classified as dual-use goods, which restricts the entry of devices such as incubators, ventilators, ultrasound machines and mobile maternity units. The consequence is that even where personnel and space exist, the system remains without the key equipment needed for stable operation.

Hospitals are operating under pressure, and evacuations have stalled again

The World Health Organization warned in March that medical evacuations from Gaza had been suspended since 28 February and that hospitals are operating under severe pressure due to shortages of medicines, medical consumables and fuel. Fuel, according to the same data, is being allocated under strict rationing in order to prioritise emergency and trauma care, maternity wards, neonatal services and the treatment of infectious diseases. Such wording sounds diplomatically restrained, but its translation is simple: the healthcare system is not functioning normally, but in survival mode.

In an enclave where a large part of the health infrastructure had already previously been devastated or seriously weakened, every new reduction in fuel and medical supplies has a multiplied effect. A generator that is not working does not mean only a lack of electricity, but also a risk for intensive care, laboratory diagnostics, the cold chain for medicines and basic hygiene protocols. When this is combined with the fact that temporary airspace restrictions disrupted the movement of medical shipments from regional logistical hubs, it becomes clear that Gaza has once again been pushed to the brink of acute health paralysis.

Humanitarian agencies also warn of longer-term consequences. Sexual and reproductive health services have remained severely disrupted, and a series of disease screening and treatment programmes has been practically suspended since the beginning of the war. This means that the crisis in Gaza is not only a story about the wounded and emergency cases, but also about a less visible wave of patients whose treatment is delayed until it becomes too late.

Reconstruction exists on paper, but money does not follow political clarity

The financial dimension of the crisis is equally bleak. The World Bank, the European Union and the United Nations estimated that Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction needs reach around 53 billion US dollars. Damage to physical structures alone was estimated at around 30 billion dollars, with housing being the hardest-hit sector. In addition, the losses in the economy, public services and infrastructure are enormous, and the removal of tens of millions of tonnes of rubble represents a separate logistical and financial undertaking.

But the biggest problem is not only the size of the bill, but the political framework in which that money should be spent. Donors, as a rule, do not want to invest in an area where it is not clear who ensures civilian administration, how the spending of funds will be monitored, who controls security on the ground, and whether there is any guarantee that new destruction will not wipe out every investment. That is why the debate on reconstruction is increasingly turning into a debate on governance. Construction materials, energy systems, schools and hospitals cannot be separated from the questions of who signs the projects, who issues permits, who collects revenues and who ultimately has the monopoly on armed force.

It is precisely for this reason that the Arab plan for early recovery and reconstruction, endorsed at the extraordinary summit in Cairo in March 2025, was politically important beyond the financial framework itself. Arab states supported the Egyptian proposal for the reconstruction of Gaza in coordination with the State of Palestine, with the mobilisation of financial, material and political support and with the idea that reconstruction should proceed in parallel with a political process that would lead towards a sustainable solution. The same document emphasised the need for the unhindered delivery of aid, the return of the displaced and a donor conference in Cairo. In this way, the message was sent that the Arab bloc wants a political framework in which Gaza remains Palestinian territory and in which reconstruction must not serve as an instrument of permanent population reshuffling.

Who will govern Gaza remains the hardest question

This is where the problem arises on which almost all international proposals stumble. For some Western and regional actors, an acceptable way out implies strengthening a reformed Palestinian Authority and its gradual return to governing Gaza. At the end of 2025, at the meeting of the Palestinian Donor Group, the European Union explicitly stressed that a sustainable peace requires a strong and reformed Palestinian Authority capable of governing its population, with meaningful Palestinian participation in shaping Gaza’s future.

Such a position is politically understandable, but on the ground it is not easy to implement. The Palestinian Authority has had no real governing control over Gaza for years, its legitimacy among Palestinians has been damaged, and intra-Palestinian divisions remain deep. On the other hand, Israel rejects a model that would mean the restoration of Hamas’s military or political strength, while at the same time there is no broadly accepted mechanism that would quickly and credibly fill the institutional vacuum. In that gap lies the current deadlock: everyone speaks about the “day after”, but no one has yet managed to offer a formula that simultaneously resolves Israel’s security demands, the Palestinian right to political representation, the regional interests of Egypt and the Gulf states, and the donors’ demands for oversight and accountability.

That is why even humanitarian aid is increasingly viewed through a political lens. It is not only about who delivers flour or fuel, but also about who thereby gains legitimacy on the ground. In a war-ravaged area, every organised distribution of food, shelter and basic services very quickly also becomes a form of power. Whoever can establish order, beneficiary lists, convoy protection and elementary administration acquires political weight that is later difficult to ignore.

UNRWA, international agencies and an ever narrower operational space

The question of the role of UNRWA and other international agencies remains particularly sensitive. In its reports, UNRWA stated that since March 2025 it has been prevented from directly bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into Gaza, although outside the enclave it still has pre-positioned stocks of food, flour and shelter materials for a large number of people. This shows the paradox of the current situation: some of the aid physically exists, but its real value depends on the political and security permission for it to reach civilians at all.

As the operational space narrows, the humanitarian system shifts into a regime of priorities and rationalisation. This means that everything not directly connected with saving lives is abandoned, while long-term needs are again pushed aside. In such a model, education, psychosocial support, preventive medicine, the restoration of municipal infrastructure and every attempt to return life to at least partial normality are the first to suffer. And without such sectors there is no real recovery, only prolonged management of catastrophe.

OCHA also recorded that since January 2026 the education cluster in Gaza has reached more than 107 thousand schoolchildren through temporary learning spaces. This shows that the international system is still trying to maintain at least minimal civilian functions. But that figure also reveals the scale of the problem: when children’s schooling is largely organised through temporary spaces and emergency-condition kits, it is clear how far the social infrastructure is from real reconstruction.

Why Gaza remains the political epicentre of the region

Even while other fronts are burning, Gaza remains the political epicentre because it concentrates within itself all the open questions of the Middle East. In it are simultaneously refracted Israeli security doctrine, Palestinian statehood, Hamas’s position, the role of Egypt and Qatar as mediators, the aspirations of Arab states to shape the post-war arrangement, and the interest of Europe and international financial institutions to help reconstruction without entering a model that could be short-lived or politically compromised.

That is why every regional escalation, even one that at first glance takes place outside Gaza itself, almost automatically returns the focus to the enclave. If corridors are closed, if the airspace tightens, if security anxiety grows or negotiating capital is redirected to the conflict with Iran, Gaza immediately feels the consequences. It has remained the most sensitive point of the region precisely because its recovery is the least autonomous: it depends on external powers, crossings, political guarantees and security arrangements that the local population cannot produce on its own.

This is also where the greatest danger for the coming period lies. If international actors continue to talk about reconstruction without a clear answer to the question of who governs Gaza and how stable access to aid and investments will be ensured, reconstruction will remain only a diplomatic formula. And if the security logic continues to impose itself ahead of civilian reconstruction, Gaza will remain a space of temporary solutions, intermittent ceasefires and chronic dependence on humanitarian aid. In that sense, Gaza’s problem today is no longer only how to stop the war, but how to prevent the post-war period from becoming a new, long-term form of political blockade.

Sources:

• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – report of 6 March 2026 on the effect of the regional escalation on Gaza, the closure of crossings and the suspension of humanitarian movements. Link
• World Health Organization – statement of 11 March 2026 on suspended medical evacuations, shortages of medicines and fuel, and pressure on hospitals in Gaza. Link
• World Bank – assessment of damage, losses and reconstruction needs in Gaza and the West Bank, including an estimate of around 53 billion dollars for recovery and reconstruction. Link
• Presidency of Egypt – final statement of the extraordinary Arab summit on Palestine, supporting the Egyptian plan for Gaza’s early recovery and reconstruction and calling for a donor conference. Link
• European Commission / EU – summary of the Palestinian Donor Group meeting on the need for a strong and reformed Palestinian Authority as part of sustainable governance and recovery. Link
• UNRWA – situation reports from February and March 2026 on the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, the reopening of Kerem Shalom for the gradual entry of aid, and restrictions on the direct entry of aid and personnel. Link
• OCHA – data page on the movement of people and goods through Gaza crossings, with an overview of long-term restrictions and changes in the crossing regime. Link