Germany enters a year that could reshape European politics
In mid-March 2026, Germany entered a political cycle that is no longer viewed only as a domestic story of Europe’s largest economy, but as a test of the stability of the political centre in the European Union. In a country that, after the 2025 federal election, is once again governed by a coalition made up of the Christian Democratic bloc CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic SPD, every new regional vote is immediately read both as a message to Berlin, and as a signal to Brussels, and as an indicator of how strong the parties that want to preserve the existing European course really are. That is why the series of elections during 2026 in Germany carries a weight that goes beyond the borders of individual federal states: it shows whether the political centre can hold under the pressure of economic uncertainty, migration disputes, the energy transition and the rise of the far right.
The first major test has already shown how sensitive the year is
The first serious political signal arrived on 8 March in Baden-Württemberg, one of Germany’s most important industrial and export-oriented federal states. There, the Greens won 30.2 percent of the vote and narrowly finished ahead of the CDU, which received 29.7 percent, while the AfD jumped to 18.8 percent and achieved its best result to date in that western federal state. The SPD meanwhile fell to 5.5 percent, and the FDP failed to cross the electoral threshold. Such an outcome is important for at least three reasons. First, it showed that Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his federal government cannot assume that the change of power in Berlin alone will automatically return voters to the traditional parties. Second, it confirmed that the AfD is no longer a phenomenon limited only to the east of the country. Third, it revealed how political competition in Germany is increasingly being fought over the question of who can be the more convincing crisis manager, and not only over the classic left-right ideological divide.
Baden-Württemberg is precisely a particularly sensitive barometer because it is a state strongly linked to the automotive industry, exports, green transformation and the technology sector. When voters in such an economic centre send a message of distrust toward part of the governing coalition and at the same time strengthen a protest vote or a harder right-wing voice, the rest of Europe does not read that as an isolated regional incident. It is observed as an indicator of a deeper mood in the country that has often been the political and fiscal pillar of the European project.
Why regional elections in Germany are followed as a European issue
Germany’s federal system gives the states political weight that is greater than in many other member states of the European Union. Regional governments participate in the work of the Bundesrat, and it is precisely through that chamber that important laws are often decided, from tax and social issues to energy, migration and administrative reforms. That is why a weaker result for the parties that carry federal power does not remain merely symbolic damage. It can also make the implementation of federal policies more difficult, deepen conflicts within the coalition and accelerate internal reassessments in Berlin.
This is especially important after the federal election of 23 February 2025, in which the CDU/CSU won 28.6 percent of the second votes, and the AfD 20.8 percent, making that party for the first time the second strongest parliamentary force in the Bundestag. The coalition agreement of the CDU, CSU and SPD was signed on 5 May 2025, and the following day Friedrich Merz became chancellor. Formally speaking, Germany has a stable government. Politically speaking, however, that stability is constantly being tested on the ground, especially where it can be seen how capable the federal coalition is of retaining the confidence of voters outside Berlin.
The AfD is no longer just a protest footnote of German politics
The rise of the AfD is the most important element that turns 2026 into a potentially pivotal year. In Germany there is still a strong political and historical reflex against the far right entering government, and the leading parties still publicly repeat that they will not cooperate with the AfD. This so-called political firewall remains one of the key barriers against the normalization of a party that has been built for years on a hard anti-migration, anti-establishment and Eurosceptic tone. But at the same time it is becoming increasingly obvious that the isolation of the AfD alone does not solve the political problem if that party continues to grow, win new voter strongholds and pressure competitors to adopt parts of its vocabulary and themes.
In that sense, Baden-Württemberg is an important signal. The AfD did not win there, but it showed that it can grow strongly in the western part of the country as well, in an area that was long considered more resistant to that kind of political mobilization. That changes the way traditional parties plan campaigns, formulate messages and choose political emphases. The pressure is no longer only in the eastern federal states, where the AfD has been very strong for years, but also in wealthier and economically more developed environments in the west. This changes the entire German political map.
What comes after Baden-Württemberg
According to the calendar of Germany’s federal electoral administration, elections in Rhineland-Palatinate follow as early as 22 March. After that, Saxony-Anhalt votes on 6 September, and on 20 September elections are held for the Berlin House of Representatives and for the parliament of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. This is a series of elections that includes both the west and the east of the country, both industrial centres and politically symbolic spaces, and both urban and rural environments. In other words, 2026 will not deliver only one message, but an entire series of political measurements of public sentiment.
Rhineland-Palatinate is particularly interesting because there the SPD is trying to retain an important regional stronghold at a time when it has been seriously weakened at the federal level. If the Social Democrats underperform there, pressure on their leadership could intensify further, and every new weakness of the smaller coalition partner in Berlin automatically raises the question of how politically resilient the federal government is. Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania carry a different kind of risk: these are areas where the strength of the AfD has long been watched with particular attention, because it is precisely there that the far right sees the greatest chance for a new breakthrough. Berlin, meanwhile, is a separate political laboratory, where questions of housing, migration, public services, security and identity politics mix, so the result there often has a strong symbolic effect beyond the city itself.
A weaker result for the ruling parties is not only a domestic problem for Berlin
Every decline of the parties that carry federal power in Germany has a European dimension because Berlin participates in almost all key debates within the Union. Germany is crucial for fiscal rules, industrial policy, the energy transition, the expansion of defence capacities, relations with China, support for Ukraine and shaping the European response to migration. If the German government appears weakened, more cautious or more preoccupied with internal conflicts, part of European decision-making also slows down.
That is exactly why European capitals are carefully watching whether Merz’s government can impose an impression of political control or whether it will constantly be forced to react to regional blows and the rise of the far right. For Europe, it is also not irrelevant what message voters will send in a country that has often served as an argument that economic modernization, fiscal discipline and a pro-European course can be held together. If it turns out that such a formula no longer convinces a large part of the electorate, the consequences will not stop at Germany’s border.
The economy, migration and security remain the three axes of political pressure
Behind the electoral shifts lies a combination of issues that overlap with one another. For some time now, the German economy has been seeking a convincing answer to slowing growth, pressure on industry, high energy costs and the question of how to finance the technological and climate transition without an additional blow to competitiveness. At the same time, migration remains a strong political mobilizer, especially where voters feel that the state is losing control over rules, procedures or integration. The third axis is security in the broadest sense, from the war in Ukraine to questions of defence, strategic autonomy and the resilience of European industry.
In such an environment, traditional parties no longer automatically receive trust simply because they appear more experienced or statesmanlike. Voters are looking for results, speed and a sense of political control. Where they do not see that, space opens up for sharper options, for regional political stars or for protest voting. That is precisely why regional elections in Germany today speak not only about local candidates and state issues, but also about the depth of distrust toward the model of governance that dominated for years.
Can the political centre withstand a year of trials
The most important question is not whether the AfD will immediately enter government at the federal level, because at this moment there is no political majority for that among the other major parties. The real question is whether the political centre can offer a sufficiently convincing answer to stop further erosion. That means simultaneously addressing economic weaknesses, reducing social nervousness, offering a credible migration policy and at the same time not giving up democratic standards. That is a more difficult task than simply repeating that there will be no cooperation with the far right.
Germany is therefore entering a year in which every regional result will be read as part of a bigger picture. If the traditional parties win and manage to retain the central political space, Berlin will gain time and room for manoeuvre to conduct federal and European policy. But if they continue to lose momentum, 2026 could prove to be the year in which not only the balance of power among German parties was changing, but also the broader European sense of political stability.
Sources:- Die Bundeswahlleiterin – official calendar of upcoming elections in Germany, including dates in 2026 (link)- Die Bundeswahlleiterin – official final results of the 2025 federal election for the Bundestag (link)- Bundesregierung – confirmation that the coalition agreement of the CDU, CSU and SPD was signed on 5 May 2025 (link)- Bundesregierung – composition of the current federal government and confirmation that Chancellor Friedrich Merz heads the cabinet (link)- AP News – report on the Baden-Württemberg election of 8 March 2026 and the political significance of the result for the federal government (link)- Financial Times – analysis of the regional election in Baden-Württemberg and its effects on Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Germany’s political year (link)
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