The EU opens a new chapter in industrial policy: “Made in EU” is no longer a slogan, but a legislative direction
On March 3, 2026, the European Commission presented the Industrial Accelerator Act, a proposed regulation aimed at strengthening domestic production in strategic sectors and increasing demand for European, low-carbon products and technologies. It is one of Brussels’ most direct attempts to connect industrial, climate, and trade policy within the same package: the goal is no longer only decarbonisation, but also retaining production, jobs, investments, and key supply chains within the European Union. In practice, this means that public procurement, state aid, and part of the investment rules should in the future more strongly favour goods and technologies produced in Europe, especially where the Union considers itself too dependent on external suppliers. In doing so, the Commission openly speaks about “Made in EU” criteria, giving the previous European rhetoric on open trade a noticeably tougher industrial tone.
Such a shift did not come suddenly, but it has now for the first time been translated into such a clear regulatory proposal. Over the past several years, through the energy crisis, supply chain disruptions, U.S. incentives for green industry, and the strong growth of Chinese production, Brussels has been warning ever more openly about Europe’s strategic dependencies. In that context, the Industrial Accelerator Act is not just a technical regulation, but also a political message that the EU no longer wants to be primarily a market for the import of finished clean technologies, but a space in which such technologies are developed, produced, and installed. In this way, industrial policy returns to the very centre of the European project, and the question of competitiveness becomes just as important as climate goals.
From the “clean transition” to industrial defence
The Commission links the proposal to the broader framework of the Clean Industrial Deal, presented as early as February 26, 2025, which announced that the EU would more strongly support domestic production of clean technologies and energy-intensive industries. That document had already outlined that future legislation would increase demand for European clean products through sustainability, resilience, and European preference criteria in public procurement, alongside the creation of markets for low-carbon industrial products. This week’s proposal now makes that direction concrete: “Made in EU” is no longer a political slogan from speeches by European officials, but the basis for future rules in strategic sectors.
The broader context explains why the Commission took this path. In its reviews of industrial policy, the Council of the EU emphasises that the Union wants to strengthen competitiveness, the resilience of the single market, and strategic autonomy, while reducing dependence on third countries for critical raw materials and technologies. The Net-Zero Industry Act, which entered into force in 2024, already set the framework for strengthening European production of clean technologies and laid down the goal that by 2030 Europe should produce capacity for at least 40 percent of the Union’s annual needs for strategic net-zero technologies. The Industrial Accelerator Act goes a step further: it deals not only with supply and production capacity, but also with creating guaranteed demand for European goods when public money is spent or when the state directs the market through aid.
That is an important difference. The European response so far has mainly relied on subsidies, the easing of state aid rules, and the acceleration of permits. The new proposal tries to change the very logic of the market: if Europe wants to have factories for batteries, grid equipment, solar components, low-carbon steel, or other key industrial products, then it must also secure buyers for those goods. In other words, the Commission is trying to connect public spending, industrial strategy, and the climate transition into a single system of incentives.
What exactly the Industrial Accelerator Act brings
According to the official explanations of the European Commission, the proposal introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and public support programmes in key strategic sectors. The focus is on European products and technologies that can contribute to decarbonisation, but also to reducing external dependence. In this regard, the Commission has already indicated that during 2026 it will revise the broader public procurement framework in order to introduce sustainability, resilience, and European preference criteria in strategic areas. In other words, the lowest price alone will no longer be decisive, but also where the product was made, what its carbon footprint is, how secure the supply chain is, and whether the investment contributes to the European industrial base.
On the Commission page monitoring the Clean Industrial Deal, it was also published that the proposal sets conditions for investments of at least 100 million euros when they come from companies from countries outside the EU that control more than 40 percent of global production capacity in areas such as electric vehicles, batteries, solar, and critical raw materials. For such investments to be acceptable, according to the Commission’s explanation, they would have to create quality jobs, innovation, real added value in the EU, and meet local content requirements. This shows that the proposal is not limited only to promoting European goods, but also to filtering foreign capital through the lens of economic security.
In practice, such an approach could mean that access to subsidies, tenders, or other public instruments will be significantly easier for manufacturers that have production and supply chains within Europe, or within the circle of countries with which the Union has special agreements and reciprocal market access. At the same time, manufacturers that rely on highly dominant external supply chains could face additional conditions, proof of origin, and regulatory obstacles. In this way, the Commission wants to reduce the risk that European money stimulates the growth of the industrial base outside Europe, while domestic manufacturers remain under pressure from cheaper imports and more expensive energy.
Steel, cement, batteries and solar: the sectors where the real impact will be seen
Although the political message is broad, the actual effects of the law will first be seen in several sectors. In energy-intensive branches such as steel, cement, and the chemical industry, the problem is not only the price of energy, but also the fact that European manufacturers must invest in decarbonisation while simultaneously competing with goods from systems with less stringent rules. The Commission has therefore for some time been advocating the creation of “lead markets”, that is, markets in which buyers will be willing to pay more for cleaner industrial products, especially when they are bought by the public sector. In that context, as early as 2025, the introduction of a voluntary carbon intensity label for industrial products was announced, first for steel and then for cement as well, in order to show the market more clearly the difference between standard and low-carbon production.
In clean technologies, the focus is on ensuring that Europe does not remain only a regulator and buyer, but also becomes a producer. The Net-Zero Industry Act has already set the goal of strengthening domestic production of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, heat pumps, grid equipment, and other strategic technologies. The Industrial Accelerator Act should now help ensure that these capacities are actually filled with orders. This is particularly important after years of warnings that European solar and battery manufacturers are struggling to compete with Asian producers, primarily because of prices, scale of production, and state support in third countries.
The automotive sector represents an additional sensitive area. In other legislative proposals for 2026, the Commission has already announced that future rules should help “maintain European production of key components of electric vehicles sold in the EU”, so that public support for the automotive sector is conditioned by resilience and sustainability criteria. This points to the intention that the European transition to electric vehicles should not turn into a situation in which mostly imported products are bought in Europe, while domestic suppliers and manufacturers lose market share.
Why Brussels is now speaking the language of industrial protection
Behind the proposal there is also a deeper change in the EU’s political vocabulary. For years, Brussels was wary of anything that could be interpreted as protectionism, and gave priority to competition rules and open trade. Today, however, European institutions are increasingly talking about economic security, resilience, reciprocal trade, and strategic autonomy. In the documents of the Council of the EU, this is directly linked to reducing dependence on critical raw materials and technologies, while the Commission, in its 2026 annual report on the single market and competitiveness, warns of growing pressure from third countries, the redirection of production surpluses towards the European market, and the increasingly open “weaponisation of dependency” in the international economy.
This is not only a European reaction to China, although the Chinese factor is evident. At the same time, the Commission is also responding to the American Inflation Reduction Act, to wartime and energy insecurity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and to the increasingly pronounced fear that Europe will remain between two great powers as a technological and industrial buyer, rather than a producer. That is why “industrial sovereignty” is being mentioned more and more often in European language, and less exclusively market neutrality. The Industrial Accelerator Act is precisely the expression of that change: Brussels still formally speaks of openness, but openness that is no longer unconditional.
Possible resistance: price, bureaucracy and trade tensions
Although the Commission presents the proposal as a way to strengthen European production, jobs, and the technological base, resistance is expected and is already visible. Some member states and industry associations fear that stricter local content requirements could increase costs, slow down procurement, and further complicate cross-border value chains. Particularly sensitive is the question of how to define a “European” product in industries in which components, raw materials, and final assembly are distributed across several countries, including partners outside the EU.
There is also the foreign trade dimension. Several media reports after the presentation of the proposal warned that the new rules could cause tensions with partners such as the United Kingdom or Japan, but also open new questions in relations with China. Part of European industries, especially the automotive industry, is deeply integrated with global supply chains and fears reciprocal measures or that closing the market too quickly will make the transition more expensive. On the other hand, supporters of the proposal argue that Europe no longer has the luxury of remaining completely open while other major economies aggressively protect their own production and use subsidies as an industrial weapon.
The question of implementation is also open. It is one thing to adopt politically attractive rules, and another to implement them without creating new bureaucracy. If companies are required to provide complex proof of origin, the share of domestic production, carbon intensity, and ownership structure, smaller manufacturers could find themselves under disproportionate administrative pressure. That is why precise definitions, sectoral exemptions, and transitional periods will play an important role in the further debate.
What the proposal says about the direction of Europe
Regardless of how the negotiations in the European Parliament and among the member states end, one thing is already clear: the EU has taken another step towards an active industrial policy that openly chooses priorities. The Industrial Accelerator Act shows that European climate policy is no longer conducted only through emission reduction targets, but also through the question of where steel, batteries, grid equipment, solar components, and other goods crucial for the energy and technological transition will be produced. In this way, a topic that for years was on the margins returns to the European centre of decision-making: can the Union remain economically relevant if it leaves production to others while itself retaining only consumption, standards, and regulation.
For European citizens and businesses, the debate on the “Made in EU” policy is therefore not abstract. It concerns the cost of the transition, the future of industrial jobs, the position of European manufacturers, and the resilience of the economy to external shocks. The Commission is now proposing an answer that is far more decisive than it was a few years ago: Europe wants climate neutrality, but not at the price of further deindustrialisation. Whether that attempt will result in a new investment cycle and stronger domestic production or turn into a dispute between industrial protection and the open market will depend on the political will of the member states and on how successfully Brussels manages to reconcile green ambitions, market rules, and geopolitical reality.
Sources:- European Commission – official page on the Clean Industrial Deal with an overview of the goals, financing, and the place of the Industrial Accelerator Act in the new industrial strategy (link)- European Commission, Press corner – announcement on the presentation of the Industrial Accelerator Act of March 3, 2026, and the official description of the proposal (link)- European Commission – communication on the Clean Industrial Deal with details on demand for EU-made products, carbon intensity labels, and planned financing (link)- Council of the European Union – overview of the goals of EU industrial policy, strategic autonomy, critical raw materials, and the Net-Zero Industry Act (link)- EUR-Lex – the Commission’s annual report on the single market and competitiveness for 2026, with an emphasis on pressure from third countries and the need to strengthen industrial resilience (link)- European Commission – page on the Net-Zero Industry Act as the existing regulatory framework for strengthening domestic production of clean technologies (link)
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