Beirut airport under fire: how Beirut survives between war, security and global air hubs

Beirut runway under pressure: how the airport survives while the region burns, and Tel Aviv, Doha and Dubai offer completely different models of resilience

When airport resilience is discussed, people often think of backup power systems, security protocols, additional runways and emergency procedures. But in Beirut’s case, resilience in recent years has had a much rawer meaning: maintaining an air link with the world even when explosions can be heard not far from the terminal, when some foreign carriers suspend flights, and when every operating hour depends on a new risk assessment. Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport is therefore more than a transport hub. In Lebanon’s crises, it has often become the state’s last functional link with the outside world, a place through which returns, evacuations, aid arrivals and a minimum of economic continuity take place.

That is precisely why comparing Beirut with Tel Aviv, Doha and Dubai reveals that the concept of a “resilient airport” does not mean the same thing everywhere. In Israel, resilience has been built for decades through a layered security architecture, mandatory checks and a state system accustomed to treating transport infrastructure as an extension of national security. In the Gulf states, especially in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, resilience is based on capital, planning, redundant systems and the construction of global hubs that must function almost without interruption because national development strategies depend on them. In Beirut, the picture is different: there, continuity is not primarily the result of comfort or vast reserve capacity, but a combination of improvisation, experience, political necessity and a willingness to keep operations running even under conditions that in many other places would lead to a complete standstill.

Beirut as the last link with the world

Lebanon has only one major international passenger airport, and that fact alone explains why the question of its operation is so sensitive. When Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport slows down or comes under threat, it affects not only tourist traffic but the entire rhythm of the country: the diaspora, business travellers, transport of time-sensitive goods, diplomatic missions and humanitarian operations. The airport’s official website and the Lebanese civil aviation authority still publish regular information on flights, terminal access, security services and airport departments, showing that despite political and security shocks, the institutional framework is trying to preserve both an impression and a minimum of predictability.

That, however, does not mean normality in the classical sense of the word. During periods of heightened tensions in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, Beirut airport itself became a symbol of the fact that civil traffic in Lebanon is being maintained at the limit of endurance. Associated Press, at the height of the Israeli strikes in 2024, described how the national carrier Middle East Airlines continued flying even as strikes drew closer to the southern Beirut area, while numerous foreign companies reduced or cancelled routes. In such circumstances, the flight schedule is not just a commercial category, but also a security decision that changes from hour to hour. Continuity is then measured not by travel comfort, but by the fact that the runway remains open, that aircraft land and take off, and that the country is not cut off.

For passengers, this means an entirely different experience from that at large, stable hubs. Delays, extraordinary schedule changes and a sudden drop in the number of carriers do not occur only because of weather conditions or technical reasons, but because of the regional security situation. Still, it is precisely within this instability that Beirut develops a specific form of operational resilience: it relies less on breadth of choice and more on preserving the airport’s basic function even when everything around it is uncertain.

Sustainability born of necessity, not from an excess of resources

The most important difference between Beirut and its major Middle Eastern competitors is that Lebanon does not have the same financial and infrastructural reserves. Doha and Dubai build resilience by investing in advance, expanding terminals, automating processes and strengthening their carrier networks before problems arise. Beirut far more often adapts in the middle of a problem. That does not mean modernisation does not exist. Lebanon’s state news agency NNA reported in April 2025 on the appearance of Public Works and Transport Minister Fayez Rasamny at an ICAO conference in Doha, where it was stated that the modernisation of Beirut airport should improve passenger processes, border management and the balance between security and flow. In other words, Lebanon is also aware that improvisation alone is not enough in the long term.

But the problem is that in Beirut, modernisation takes place in parallel with crises, not after them. Every plan for reconstruction, technical upgrading or improvement of the passenger experience must live alongside the possibility of a new security disruption. This creates a paradox: the airport must be reformed and rescued at the same time. In more stable systems, these are two separate phases. In Lebanon, they are often one and the same operation.

In such a situation, Middle East Airlines also plays a key role. When foreign carriers reduce their presence, the national airline effectively takes on the role of the state’s transport insurer. That brings additional pressure, but also explains why, in Beirut’s case, the boundary between civil aviation, national interest and crisis management is much thinner than elsewhere. Resilience is therefore visible not only in the operation of the terminal, but also in the willingness of the domestic system to take on greater risk so that minimum connectivity remains alive.

Tel Aviv: security as the foundation of operations

If Beirut shows resilience born of necessity, Tel Aviv shows resilience by design. Ben Gurion Airport has for years been cited as one of the safest airports in the world, and the Israel Airports Authority openly describes its multi-layered security model: access control, mandatory passenger security questioning, surveillance systems and the presence of armed guards. A passenger in Tel Aviv often enters the state’s security logic already on the approach to the terminal, a logic that assumes a threat exists even before a specific incident appears.

That, however, does not mean Ben Gurion is immune to regional shocks. On the contrary, in recent years that airport too has repeatedly faced temporary disruptions, including the suspension of part of international flights after missile attacks and heightened regional tensions. The difference is that Israel responds to such episodes with pre-built security infrastructure and a clear command logic. The system is more expensive, tougher and more demanding for passengers, but it is designed precisely to operate in a high-risk environment.

Compared with Beirut, Tel Aviv has two major advantages. The first is state investment in security depth, that is, in a series of barriers and procedures that begin long before boarding. The second is the institutional ability to implement traffic restrictions quickly and in a coordinated manner when they are needed. While Beirut mostly tries to maintain openness because it has few alternatives, Ben Gurion can more often afford stricter filters, traffic redistribution and security slowdowns that are built into the airport’s very identity.

Doha and Dubai: resilience without a war framework

A third model of resilience can be seen in Doha and Dubai, but there the security story is not dominant in the same way as in Beirut or Tel Aviv. Hamad International Airport in Doha announced that in 2024 it handled 52.7 million passengers, with more than four million passengers per month and the expansion of the network to almost 200 destinations. Dubai International went even further: according to official data from Dubai Airports, DXB reached a record 92.3 million passengers in 2024. Such figures are not just statistics of success, but also an indicator of a different understanding of resilience. In these systems, the most important thing is for the flow to remain smooth, capacity high, and disruption as invisible to the passenger as possible.

Gulf hubs build continuity through scale. Large terminals, strong financing, technological solutions, a large fleet of connected carriers and strategic planning allow them to absorb market shocks, seasonal peaks and operational incidents without the sense of drama that accompanies Beirut. There, resilience means that the passenger often does not even notice how many processes in the background must be synchronised for the system to work. In Beirut, the opposite is true: the crisis is visible, and continuity becomes part of the public story.

That is precisely why comparison with Doha and Dubai has its limitations. These airports truly show what top-level designed operational stability looks like, but they do not go through the same kind of immediate military threat right next to the urban area. Their resilience is therefore above all managerial, technological and infrastructural. Beirut’s is existential. One is built with money and planning, the other is maintained under the pressure of political and security uncertainty.

What does “keeping the runway open” actually mean

In public discourse, airport operations are often reduced to a binary picture: it is open or it is closed. But between those two states there is a whole spectrum of limitations. An airport may formally operate while traffic is reduced, while some carriers do not fly, while insurers and leasing companies raise warnings, while crews enter additional security procedures, and while the schedule depends on assessments that are not fully visible to the public. In that sense, Beirut airport offers an important lesson about modern aviation: operational continuity is not the same as normal business operations.

Lebanon must therefore balance between two opposing pressures. On the one hand, there is the need to keep the airport open because a complete interruption would have enormous economic, social and political consequences. On the other hand, any insistence on openness carries risk if the security picture suddenly deteriorates. It is precisely here that the difference between institutionally wealthy and institutionally vulnerable states becomes clear. In wealthier systems, closing one hub is more easily cushioned by alternatives. In Lebanon, the price of interruption is much higher because alternatives are almost non-existent.

That is why the “art of keeping the runway open” in Beirut’s case is not a phrase, but a description of everyday life. It implies constant risk assessment, coordination with state security bodies, adaptation of air traffic, pressure on the domestic carrier and psychological management of public perception. When such a system works, it does not look spectacular like a new terminal or record passenger figures. Its success is measured by the fact that the link with the world has not been broken.

International standards and the limits of local reality

An important part of the story also relates to the regulatory framework. Through its USOAP programme, ICAO assesses how effectively states implement the key elements of civil aviation safety oversight. That is not the same as assessing the war risk around a particular airport, but it is an important indicator of a state’s institutional capacity to oversee the safety of the air transport system. Lebanon therefore cannot rely in the long term only on a reputation for endurance. For the airport to remain credible for both carriers and passengers, investment in oversight, procedures, facilitation of passenger flow and infrastructure modernisation is essential.

Official Lebanese messages in recent months have stressed exactly that. In appearances connected with ICAO, the authorities speak of a balance between security, sustainability and easier travel, while domestic media also record concrete works to improve the functionality of the terminal. But the real test is not in conference statements, but in whether modernisation will be able to survive the next cycle of regional tensions. In a country that often manages crisis in real time, reforms are judged not only by whether they have been launched, but by whether they can survive when the environment worsens again.

Beirut between symbol and infrastructure

Beirut airport therefore has a dual role. It is an infrastructure facility, but also a political and social symbol. For many Lebanese, especially those in the diaspora, its operation means that the state has not yet been completely cut off. For the economy, it means that there is at least a minimal channel towards markets, partners and investors. For diplomatic and humanitarian actors, it means that in a moment of crisis there is still a point of entry and exit. And for the authorities, it represents the place where the state’s ability or inability to preserve the elementary function of the system is publicly visible.

That is precisely why comparison with Tel Aviv, Doha and Dubai is useful, but only if it is not reduced to a mere ranking of “better” and “worse” airports. Ben Gurion shows what a security-fortified airport built for permanent readiness looks like. Doha and Dubai show what a strategic hub with capital, technological surplus and long-term planning looks like. Beirut shows something else: how infrastructure becomes the state’s line of endurance when it cannot afford a prolonged interruption, even when surrounded by instability.

In that sense, Beirut’s runway is not a story of perfectly designed resilience, but of the limit to which civil infrastructure can withstand pressure. While Doha and Dubai optimise the passenger experience, and Tel Aviv manages security risk firmly, Beirut is still defending the very possibility of normal take-offs and landings. And it is precisely in that difference that the essence of the whole story lies: some airports prove their strength through efficiency, and some through the simple fact that despite everything, they are still operating.

Sources:

• - Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport – official information on operations, services and passenger information (link)
• - Directorate General of Civil Aviation Lebanon – overview of airport services, security and airport management (link)
• - Associated Press – report on the continuation of Middle East Airlines operations and the functioning of Beirut airport during the Israeli strikes in 2024 (link)
• - National News Agency Lebanon – statement by Minister Fayez Rasamny on the modernisation of Beirut airport and cooperation with ICAO (link)
• - ICAO USOAP – official overview of civil aviation safety oversight results by country (link)
• - Israel Airports Authority – official security instructions and description of checks at Ben Gurion Airport (link)
• - Hamad International Airport – official data on record traffic and network development in 2024 (link)
• - Dubai Airports – official data on a record 92.3 million passengers through DXB in 2024 (link)