The new American tariff wave is once again shaking global trade
In just two days, Washington launched a new cycle of trade investigations that could grow into yet another wave of American tariffs targeting a broad circle of partners, from the European Union and Canada to a range of Asian exporters. At the center of the American administration’s move are not only China and old trade disputes, but a much broader list of economies that Washington now links to excess industrial capacity, state support, pressure on labor costs, and insufficiently strict measures against goods produced with forced labor. In this way, United States trade policy is once again returning to the very center of global economic risk, at a moment when supply chains remain sensitive, inflationary pressures have not completely disappeared, and companies have still not finished adjusting to the previous cycle of tariff shocks.
The new moves by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the USTR, come after an important legal and political turning point in Washington. After the U.S. Supreme Court in February struck down part of the earlier tariff measures adopted on the basis of extraordinary presidential powers, President Donald Trump’s administration began seeking new legal grounds to continue the same policy. In practice, this means that the goal has not changed, but the instruments have. Instead of relying on emergency presidential powers, Washington is now activating Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a mechanism that allows investigations against what the American side claims are unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory practices by foreign governments that burden American trade.
Two waves of investigations in two days
On March 11, 2026, the USTR launched investigations against 16 economies, including the European Union, Japan, India, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and China, over what Washington calls structural excesses of capacity and production in a range of manufacturing sectors. The illustrative list of sectors includes aluminum, automobiles, batteries, chemicals, electronics, machinery, robotics, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transport equipment. The USTR claims that in these areas certain countries or blocs maintain production above market needs, often through subsidies, preferential financing, state-owned companies, weak labor or environmental protections, and other forms of intervention which, according to the American interpretation, suppress competition and make it harder to bring production back to the United States.
Already on March 12, an even broader step followed. The USTR opened as many as 60 investigations aimed at countries it believes have not established or effectively enforced a ban on the import of goods produced with forced labor. That list includes the European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, Mexico, India, Brazil, Australia, South Korea, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Taiwan, and a range of other partners. The American administration claims that these countries together account for more than 99 percent of U.S. imports from 2024, showing that this is not a targeted action against a handful of states, but a move that potentially encompasses almost the entire import space important for the American market.
For the forced labor investigations, the USTR opened a public comment period until April 15, while public hearings are expected to begin on April 28. For the excess capacity investigations, it has been accepting public comments since March 17, while hearings have been announced starting May 5. The very fact that the deadlines have been set on an accelerated basis indicates that Washington does not want a long, academic process, but rather a relatively fast political and regulatory maneuver that would allow it to re-establish a stricter tariff regime by summer.
Why this move matters right now
In the background of everything is also the temporary U.S. import surcharge of 10 percent that President Trump proclaimed on February 20, 2026, invoking section 122 of the same law. According to the text of the presidential proclamation, that measure applies to a large share of imports into the United States, with a number of exceptions, and remains in force from February 24 to July 24, 2026, unless it is suspended, amended, or repealed before then. It is important to emphasize that this is a time-limited instrument. That is precisely why the new series of investigations appears to be an attempt to create a longer-term and more legally resilient replacement for the earlier tariffs that fell in court.
In doing so, the American administration is simultaneously sending several messages. The first is domestic: the White House wants to show that it has not given up on industrial protection, the return of manufacturing, and a more aggressive approach to trade partners. The second is international: even if the courts limit one type of tariff authority, Washington will reach for another. The third is negotiating: existing agreements with allies and partners may remain on the table, but from now on they will be viewed through the prism of new investigations, new tariff threats, and new political conditions.
This creates additional uncertainty precisely because in 2025 and at the beginning of 2026 it already seemed that part of trade relations had stabilized through political agreements on reciprocal tariffs and market access. Now it is becoming clear that those agreements are not necessarily the end of the story. According to statements by U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, the basic political goal remains the same, while the legal tool can change depending on court decisions and other circumstances. In other words, U.S. partners can no longer assume that a framework agreed once will automatically guarantee long-term predictability.
What Washington is actually charging partners with
In the investigation into industrial excess capacity, the American side is not talking only about classic subsidies. Official documents list a whole package of possible practices: encouraging exports regardless of actual market demand, subsidized loans, wage repression, non-commercial behavior by state-owned or state-controlled enterprises, persistent barriers to access to the domestic market, inadequate labor and environmental protection, and even monetary and currency policies. This is a broadly framed framework that leaves Washington a great deal of room to present almost any industrial policy of foreign states as an element of unfair competition.
In the case of forced labor, the argument is formally morally and legally stronger, but here too an important geopolitical calculation is hidden. The USTR refers to the long-standing American ban on importing goods produced with forced labor and to data from the International Labour Organization, according to which around 28 million people worldwide were in forced labor in 2021. The American logic is that goods produced under such conditions have artificially lower costs and therefore unfairly suppress American manufacturers and workers. However, the inclusion of the European Union, Canada, and other allies in the same package of investigations shows that the goal is not only the protection of human rights or the suppression of problematic supply chains, but also the opening of a new legal path for broader trade pressure.
This is particularly sensitive because both the EU and Canada have themselves tightened rules against forced labor in supply chains in recent years. The European Commission states that the EU regulation on forced labor entered into force in December 2024, that member states must designate competent authorities by December 14, 2025, and that the ban will apply from December 14, 2027. Canada, for its part, recalls that as early as July 2020 it introduced a ban on the import of goods produced with forced labor, and since January 2024 it has also had in force the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act. This is precisely why the USTR’s claim that partners have not adopted and effectively enforced a ban on the import of goods produced with forced labor will probably be one of the key points of future diplomatic and legal disputes.
Risk to supply chains and prices
For companies and markets, the most important question is not only whether new tariffs will actually be introduced, but also how broad their scope will be. If the investigations under Section 301 end with recommendations for additional tariffs, the effect will not stop at customs terminals. First under pressure would be importers and industries that depend on components, machinery, metals, electronics, batteries, vehicles, and other goods covered by the disputed sectors. Then the cost would move toward manufacturers, distributors, and end customers. Ultimately, part of the burden could end up in retail prices, and part in lower corporate margins and delayed investments.
Analyses by The Budget Lab at Yale University show that American tariffs and retaliation by trade partners still have a measurable macroeconomic effect. In an assessment published on March 9, 2026, that institution states that the then-current structure of American tariffs, including the temporary measures from February, implies in the short term an increase in consumer prices of about 0.6 percent, along with a decline in the real income of the average household and weaker long-term GDP. That does not mean that these exact new investigations would automatically produce the same effect, but it clearly shows that trade policy is no longer an abstract topic for diplomatic negotiations, but a concrete channel through which political decisions spill over into household budgets, industrial plans, and financing costs.
An additional problem is that this cycle is opening at a moment when global companies are already living with multiple sources of disruption: geopolitical tensions, changes in transport routes, more expensive cargo insurance, more cautious bank financing, and pressure to diversify procurement while simultaneously cutting costs. The new American tariff wave therefore does not affect only direct imports into the United States. It forces multinational companies to once again reconsider where they produce, where they store goods, how they contract long-term deliveries, and how much premium they are willing to pay for greater predictability.
The broader picture: trade disputes are no longer just an American-Chinese story
One of the more important changes compared with earlier phases of trade conflicts is that the circle of potentially affected partners has expanded sharply. In earlier public debates, trade tension was often reduced to the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Now it is clear that the American administration is applying the same logic to the European Union, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore, Switzerland, and other economies that are otherwise U.S. allies or deeply integrated partners in manufacturing and technology chains.
This is important both politically and economically. Politically, because the possibility is growing that trade policy is being guided less and less within the classic division between allies and rivals, and more and more according to the simple criterion of American industrial interest. Economically, because allied and partner economies are often the key suppliers of advanced components, industrial equipment, automotive technology, chemicals, and pharmaceutical inputs. Any additional price increase or administrative uncertainty in that space can produce a broader effect than a tariff blow aimed exclusively at China.
It is also worth bearing in mind the state of the American foreign trade balance itself. According to data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Census Bureau, the American deficit in trade in goods and services in December 2025 rose to 70.3 billion dollars, after 53 billion dollars in November. The American administration uses precisely such figures as an argument that existing trade relations are still not sufficiently balanced. But opponents of the new tariff wave warn that tariffs by themselves do not solve the structural causes of the deficit and that they often function more as a tax on imports than as a precise development tool.
What the EU, Canada, and other partners can do
The European Union and Canada now have several possible responses, but none is simple. The first is legal and technical: in consultations and public debates, they can try to prove that their policies against forced labor already exist and that the American accusations are not based on the full picture of the regulatory framework. The second is diplomatic: to try to limit the scope of possible American measures through negotiations before the investigations turn into tariffs. The third is political: to prepare their own responses if Washington does introduce new duties.
But the problem is that the mere threat of tariffs already produces an effect, even before it enters into force. Companies do not necessarily wait for the final legal act in order to change their calculations. It is enough for them to assess that the probability of tariffs is rising for them to accelerate imports before a possible price increase, postpone new contracts, shift part of their orders, or seek alternative supply routes. Because of that, trade investigations often turn into a market event before they become a formal tariff measure.
That is precisely why this development is important for Europe, and also for Croatia, although not all consequences are direct and immediate. When American trade policy hardens toward the European Union, the effect is not reduced only to transatlantic statistics. European manufacturers that export components to German, Italian, or French industry may be indirectly affected, as may logistics companies servicing altered goods flows, but also prices of raw materials, metals, and industrial inputs on the broader market. In a world of highly interconnected supply chains, a major trade dispute rarely remains confined within the borders of the two sides.
The coming months will be decisive
From March 17 begins the submission of comments for the investigations into industrial excess capacity, from April 15 expires the deadline for comments in the forced labor cases, and at the end of April and the beginning of May public hearings begin. That means the next few weeks will be a period of intense lobbying, diplomatic contacts, and attempts to convince the American administration that some partners should not be put in the same basket as the most problematic practices of global trade. Whether that will succeed is currently unclear.
What is already clear now is that Washington has opened a new front in global trade and that this is no longer just a symbolic political message. If these investigations produce new tariffs, the global economy could enter yet another round of price increases, supply-chain adjustments, and political retaliation. And even if formal measures do not arrive in full scope, the mere fact that the United States is once again placing tariffs at the center of its economic strategy is enough for global trade to enter a new period of caution, uncertainty, and defensive moves.
Sources:- USTR – official announcement on the launch of investigations due to structural excesses of capacity and production in manufacturing sectors (link)
- USTR – official announcement on the launch of 60 investigations related to measures against goods produced with forced labor (link)
- The White House – proclamation on the temporary import surcharge of 10 percent and its duration until July 24, 2026 (link)
- USTR – statement after the Supreme Court decision on earlier tariffs and announcement of the use of alternative trade policy tools (link)
- AP – overview of the new American tariff approach, deadlines, and the scope of affected partners (link)
- European Commission – overview of the EU regulation banning products made with forced labor and implementation deadlines (link)
- Government of Canada – overview of Canada’s ban on the import of goods produced with forced labor and related measures (link)
- ILO – global estimates of 28 million people in forced labor in 2021 (link)
- BEA and U.S. Census Bureau – data on the American deficit in trade in goods and services for December 2025 (link)
- The Budget Lab at Yale – assessment of the effects of tariffs on prices, household income, and economic growth (link)
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