China continues to pressure its own petitioners
While the Chinese state leadership, during this year’s sessions of the country’s most important political bodies in Beijing, once again speaks of stability, modernization and development, one old and uncomfortable issue is once again coming to the forefront: the fate of people who, through the official petitioning system, try to obtain justice outside the local authorities. This refers to the mechanism known as
xinfang, that is, the system of “letters and visits,” through which citizens report injustices, abuses, administrative omissions, land disputes, unpaid wages, housing problems and other disputes which they believe the local level of government has not resolved or has further worsened. The very existence of this system is presented by the Chinese authorities as proof that the state listens to citizens and corrects mistakes. However, numerous testimonies, studies and recent reports show that the same system simultaneously functions as an instrument of control, the filtering of discontent and political pressure on those who refuse to remain silent.
During the days in which this year’s “two sessions” are taking place in Beijing – the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which in 2026 began on 4 and 5 March – the issue of petitioners gains additional weight. It is precisely in such politically sensitive moments that the authorities traditionally try to prevent dissatisfied citizens from arriving in the capital, so that the official image of social stability remains untouched. This is not merely an episodic security practice, but a symptom of a deeper problem: beneath the narrative of harmonious development and effective governance there are still strong signs of distrust toward local institutions, as well as the feeling that justice can often be sought only outside formal and regular channels.
The official framework: a channel for complaints, but also for managing discontent
In recent years, the Chinese authorities have not abolished the petitioning system, but have tried to strengthen it institutionally even further. In 2022, the central authorities adopted new regulations on handling public complaints and petitions, with the message that this is an important window through which society and citizens’ opinions can be understood, and disputes at the local level can be resolved. As early as 2023, the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration was placed directly under the State Council, with the official explanation that this strengthens the protection of citizens’ interests and improves the processing of petitions. In other words, Beijing is still not giving up on the idea that the central government remains the ultimate address to which an ordinary citizen can appeal when the lower levels of administration fail.
On paper, this framework looks like an institutional safety valve. Citizens can send letters, come in person, submit complaints by telephone or through internet platforms. In February 2025, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate further regulated its own system for receiving complaints, prescribing that citizens must be given a response within seven working days after a case is accepted, and that most such cases should, as a rule, be resolved within three months. For the Chinese authorities, such regulations have a dual political function: on the one hand, they show the state’s willingness to formalize and standardize the handling of complaints, and on the other, they reinforce the idea that discontent should remain within strictly controlled, hierarchical and administratively supervised channels.
The problem arises when this official model collides with practice on the ground. China’s petitioning system is not a classic independent legal remedy, nor does it guarantee judicial protection in the sense that would be expected in liberal legal orders. For many citizens, it represents a last resort precisely because local courts, local administration or the party apparatus have already failed, or because they perceive them that way. When a citizen turns to a higher instance, they also bypass the local authorities and imply that the problem is serious, unresolved and politically uncomfortable. In a system in which local cadres are still evaluated according to their ability to maintain order, such a complaint is often not perceived as a legitimate search for justice, but as a threat to political stability.
Why local authorities fear petitions
Pressure on petitioners is not only the consequence of an authoritarian reflex, but also of the specific logic of Chinese governance. For years, local officials have lived in a system in which mass complaints, protests or citizens going to Beijing can be interpreted as proof of poor governance. Formally, in recent years it has been emphasized that work on petitions should not be reduced only to numbers, but the very political culture of “maintaining stability” has remained strong. The more politically sensitive the event is – a major anniversary, a party plenum, the national parliament or a consultative conference – the greater the likelihood that local structures will resort to preventive measures so that dissatisfied citizens do not reach Beijing, the media or the wider public.
Here the paradox of the Chinese model becomes visible. The central government wants to preserve a channel through which citizens can signal that the local apparatus is not functioning. At the same time, that same government insists on a high degree of political control and public discipline. The consequence is a system in which a petition formally exists as a right, but the petitioner is often treated as a security problem. In practice, this means surveillance, interception, return to home provinces, short-term detentions and various forms of pressure that do not always have to be formally recorded as criminal proceedings, but have a clear deterrent effect.
That is precisely why the issue of petitions is much more than a technical administrative matter. It shows how the Chinese state is trying to reconcile two things that are difficult to combine: the need to offer citizens at least a symbolic path toward “higher justice” and the need to keep every independent mobilization, every public pressure and every form of organized discontent under full control. When a citizen remains within the form and waits for a response, they are part of the system. When they begin to travel, gather with others or attract media attention, that same citizen easily moves from the category of “petitioner” to the category of “risk to stability.”
Recent reports: raids, interceptions and preventive repression
Such a pattern can also be seen in more recent reports. Ahead of this year’s political sessions in Beijing, Radio Free Asia published testimonies at the end of February 2025 according to which police in the suburbs of the capital were conducting raids in neighborhoods where petitioners from other parts of China were staying. According to these claims, it was precisely the people using the official complaints system who were identified as one of the main targets of “stability maintenance” measures before the start of important political gatherings. Such information in itself does not surprise those familiar with the Chinese system, but it is important because it confirms the continuity of the method: the state does not abolish the channel for complaints, but intensifies control over those who try to use it when doing so becomes politically sensitive.
The broader context points in the same direction. In its report for 2026, Human Rights Watch describes China as a country in which human rights defenders continue to be exposed to harassment, pressure, detentions and prison sentences. Although that report does not deal only with petitioners, it is important because it shows the general institutional framework: anyone who persistently challenges the official narrative or tries to raise the issue of government accountability may face a repressive response. In such an environment, petitioners are not an isolated phenomenon, but part of a broader group of citizens trying to force the system to hear them, while the system simultaneously tries to restrict, fragment and silence them.
It is especially telling that censorship is very visibly directed precisely at content connected with petitions and protests. In the latest editions of its China Dissent Monitor, Freedom House warned that among the most heavily censored posts on the Chinese platform Douyin were precisely those relating to offline protests by petitioners, posts about protests in Beijing and content showing the detention or violence against protesters. In the period from June to December 2025, two thirds of the analyzed posts about protests were removed. This means that control is not exercised only physically, on the street and at railway stations, but also digitally, through the rapid narrowing of the space in which individual cases could turn into a broader public issue.
The social basis of discontent is not disappearing
The reason why this issue is being discussed again today is not only repression, but also the fact that the causes of discontent have not disappeared. Freedom House states that its monitor has recorded more than 14 thousand cases of dissent and protest in China since June 2022, and already in August 2025 it emphasized that more than 10 thousand protests and other forms of resistance had been documented in all parts of the country. In the first half of 2025, a strong increase was recorded in labor protests related to unpaid wages, as well as the continuation of protests connected with the housing sector, unfinished projects and the problems of property buyers. Such data do not mean that China is on the verge of a general political crisis, but they clearly show that social pressure is broad, diverse and persistent.
It is precisely here that the petitioning system gains additional importance. It becomes the channel through which the consequences of the economic slowdown, the real-estate crisis, local debts, land disputes, labor insecurity and the feeling that ordinary citizens often do not have equal access to justice spill over. When official media speak of improving the management of complaints, they are in fact inadvertently admitting that the problem exists and that it is large enough to require permanent institutional attention. When security measures are simultaneously intensified against those who try to present those complaints in person in Beijing, a different message is being sent: the state wants to hear discontent, but only on the condition that it remains strictly administered, atomized and politically sterile.
It is also important that petitions do not relate only to classic cases of corruption or local abuses. They are often a combination of legal, social and existential problems. For some citizens, this means confiscated land or disputed evictions; for others, unpaid wages, judgments they consider unjust, police conduct, local administrative decisions or requests ignored for years. Because of this, a petitioner in China is often a figure that combines several levels of crisis: they are at the same time the victim of a specific dispute, a citizen who has lost trust in local institutions and a political reminder that the official narrative of harmony is not complete.
Why this issue is politically sensitive right now
This year’s political season in Beijing further heightens the sensitivity of the issue. The “two sessions” of 2026 are not taking place in a routine atmosphere, but at a moment when China is opening a new planning period and discussing the draft of the 15th Five-Year Plan for the period 2026–2030. At such a moment, the state leadership wants to project an image of capability, cohesion and long-term direction. The story of citizens traveling to the capital because they do not trust local authorities directly undermines that image, because it suggests that there is still a serious gap between central ambition and local reality.
That is why petitioners are so uncomfortable for the Chinese political system. They do not necessarily challenge the state as a whole, at least not at the beginning. Quite the opposite, they often turn to higher authorities with the assumption that the center will correct the injustice produced by the periphery. But the very need for such an appeal already shows that the formal mechanisms of accountability are not sufficient. When there are many such cases, a political problem arises that cannot be fully resolved either by new rulebooks or by disciplining lower-level officials. The petitioning system then ceases to be only an administrative channel and becomes a barometer of the real state of trust in the state.
That is precisely why broad writing on this subject, despite censorship and the narrowed space for public discussion, says more than the procedure itself. It points to the fact that social tension, unequal access to justice and distrust toward local institutions have not disappeared from Chinese society. While Beijing publicly speaks of development, efficiency and the modernization of governance, the story of petitioners serves as a reminder that behind the official formulations there are still people who wait years for an answer, move from office to office and risk pressure precisely because they are asking the state to respect its own rules.
Sources:- - The State Council of the People's Republic of China – announcement on the 2022 regulations for handling public petitions (link)
- - The State Council of the People's Republic of China – announcement that in 2023 the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration was placed directly under the State Council (link)
- - Supreme People's Procuratorate – regulations from February 2025 on the processing of public complaints, deadlines and the method of receiving petitions (link)
- - Freedom House, China Dissent Monitor – report for October–December 2025 on the censorship of posts about protests and petitioners (link)
- - Freedom House – analysis from August 2025 on the rise of protests, labor disputes and housing problems in China (link)
- - Human Rights Watch – World Report 2026, chapter on China, for the broader context of repression against rights defenders and critical voices (link)
- - Radio Free Asia / mirror – report on pressure and detentions of petitioners ahead of the annual political sessions in Beijing (link)
- - State Council Information Office / Xinhua – official announcement on the course and significance of China’s “two sessions” in 2026 (link)
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