Iran after the strikes: war, succession, and the risk of the conflict spreading across the entire Middle East
The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, confirmed in Iranian state media after the US-Israeli strikes on February 28, has opened a new and exceptionally dangerous phase of the Middle East crisis. In just a few days, the conflict is no longer seen merely as another round of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, with strong American military support, but as a crisis that simultaneously affects the question of Iran’s state leadership, regional security, energy flows, and the possible reshaping of the political architecture of the entire area from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. At a moment when Tehran is responding with missiles, drones, and threats of retaliation, while Washington is increasing pressure with demands for “unconditional surrender,” the key question is no longer only how long Iran can endure militarily, but also who in Iran is actually making decisions today.
The strike that changed the nature of the crisis
Middle Eastern conflicts have often spread through proxy actors, militias, and limited strikes, but the events of February 28 marked a qualitative leap. According to reports by international agencies and media outlets citing Iranian state announcements, Khamenei was killed in a large wave of strikes on military and state targets in Iran. This struck the very top of the system that for decades concentrated political, security, and ideological power in a single institution and a single person. The consequences of such a strike are not merely symbolic. In the Iranian political model, the supreme leader is not a ceremonial figure, but the ultimate authority over the military, the Revolutionary Guard, the intelligence apparatus, the judiciary, and strategic foreign policy decisions. When that center disappears in the middle of a war, the consequences do not remain at the top of the state, but descend through the entire chain of command and create a vacuum that simultaneously increases the space for chaos, internal rivalry, and unpredictable military reactions.
The US-Israeli strikes therefore changed the very logic of the conflict. Until a few days ago, one could speak of targeting infrastructure, military capabilities, and the nuclear program. After Khamenei’s death, it is also a matter of decapitating the regime, that is, an attempt to accelerate the political weakening of the opponent by striking the top of the state. Such a strategy can, at least in the short term, destabilize the Iranian state apparatus. But it can also produce the opposite effect: the homogenization of hardline structures, the strengthening of the Revolutionary Guard’s influence, and the further narrowing of space for a diplomatic solution.
Who governs Iran after Khamenei
According to available information, after Khamenei’s death Iran entered a transitional period in which the duties of the supreme leader are temporarily assumed by a three-member body. At the center are President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and cleric Alireza Arafi, who is connected to the regime’s religious and institutional structures. The very fact that a collective transitional arrangement is needed shows how sensitive the system is when the figure who for decades was the ultimate arbiter among the civilian authorities, security apparatuses, and clerical establishment disappears.
But a formal transition does not mean real stability. The key body for choosing a new supreme leader is the Assembly of Experts, but in practice the decision will not depend only on constitutional procedures. In these circumstances, the security structures, especially the Revolutionary Guard, which has military force, economic resources, and great influence over strategic decisions, carry decisive weight. That is precisely why international analyses are increasingly raising the question of whether the formal selection of a new supreme leader will truly be the result of intra-institutional consensus or whether it will be under strong pressure from those centers of power that can ensure the continuity of the regime under wartime conditions.
In the circles of observers and the media, various names are most often mentioned, including Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, but according to currently available data there is no final or officially concluded decision on a permanent successor. It is precisely this uncertainty that further intensifies tensions. Iran must simultaneously defend itself against external strikes, contain the regional consequences, and resolve a question that under normal circumstances requires a closed, slow, and carefully controlled process. In a wartime environment, that process becomes rushed, politically explosive, and potentially susceptible to internal fractures.
Pezeshkian between state continuity and limited power
In recent days, President Masoud Pezeshkian has tried to create the impression that there is still a political channel in Tehran that is not completely closed to de-escalation. His messages to neighboring states, including an apology for strikes on some Gulf countries, are an important signal that part of Iran’s civilian leadership understands how costly it would be for Iran if the conflict were to spread further to Arab monarchies, maritime routes, and energy hubs. In diplomatic terms, this is an attempt to separate Iran’s state interest from the logic of unlimited retaliation.
However, according to agency reports, Pezeshkian himself admitted that he does not have full control over all military levers, especially over the Revolutionary Guard. This may be the most important sentence of this entire crisis. If the president of the state publicly shows limited influence over the apparatus that conducts wartime and retaliatory operations, then the possibility of negotiations cannot be measured only by his political statements. It depends on whether there is a minimum consensus within the Iranian system to negotiate and who has the mandate to implement that agreement on the ground. Without that, even the most conciliatory messages remain merely an attempt at political signaling toward the outside world.
For Iran’s neighbors, and especially for the countries of the Persian Gulf, this creates an additional problem. On the one hand, tones are coming from Tehran suggesting that part of the leadership wants to prevent a further regional blaze. On the other hand, that same Iran continues attacks, missiles, and threats across the wider Middle East. Such a dual image increases uncertainty among states that must assess whether this is a coordinated “carrot and stick” strategy or a real fragmentation of power within the Iranian leadership.
Regional retaliation and the danger of multiple fronts
Iran’s retaliation is no longer limited only to Israeli territory. According to reports by international media, missiles and drones struck or threatened targets in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and other parts of the region, while strikes linked to Iran’s allies and networks of influence in Lebanon and beyond are simultaneously being recorded. This confirms an old but now radically intensified logic of Iran’s strategy: conflict with Iran rarely remains confined to only one state border.
The risk for the region lies not only in the number of missiles but in the geographic breadth of possible flashpoints. At a moment when Gulf capitals, American bases, maritime routes, oil infrastructure, and civilian air traffic are under threat, every new strike increases the possibility of miscalculation, panic in the markets, and the direct pulling of additional states into the conflict. It is particularly sensitive that some of these countries simultaneously want to avoid an open war with Iran, but cannot ignore the fact that attacks are taking place on their territory or in their immediate vicinity.
That is precisely why the current crisis bears the characteristics of a regional war of low and medium intensity that can turn into a much broader conflict. All it takes is one major civilian tragedy, a larger hit on energy infrastructure, or a successful attack on an important American installation for the political threshold for a new escalation to be lowered even further. In such circumstances, even states that are formally not part of the war can no longer count on staying aside simply because they want to.
Energy markets as the second front of the crisis
One of the most important consequences of this crisis can be seen outside the battlefield, in the energy market and in global logistics. The rise in oil prices above 90 dollars per barrel is not merely an immediate reaction by investors to war news, but a reflection of fear that disruptions could spill over into the production, storage, and transport of energy products throughout the entire Gulf area. The Middle East is an important energy center not only because of the quantity of oil and gas, but also because of the narrow transport corridors through which a large part of the world’s supply passes.
If threats and attacks continue to spread to maritime routes, refineries, and export terminals, the consequences will not be felt only by the region. Rising energy costs quickly spill over into inflation, transport costs, industrial production, and the political decisions of central banks. In other words, Iran, Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states are not the only actors in this story. European economies, Asian energy importers, and markets that react to every new indication of the conflict spreading have already been drawn into it.
That is why the rhetoric from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries warning of the economic consequences is more than a diplomatic phrase. The warning that disruptions in energy exports could trigger a broader economic crisis should be read as a signal that the energy factor is becoming perhaps the strongest international incentive for urgent de-escalation. As long as there is danger to maritime traffic and key infrastructure, global pressure to contain the war will only grow.
Can the diplomatic channel still be saved
Despite the open war, several elements suggest that the diplomatic channel has not completely disappeared. First, messages are coming from the very top of Iran suggesting that there is an interest in limiting the damage and at least indirect communication. Second, the United Nations and a number of international actors are warning that the conflict threatens to spiral beyond all control and are calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Third, even states that are not politically on the same side have a strong interest in preventing the closure of energy and trade arteries.
The problem, however, is that military dynamics are currently overpowering diplomacy. The American demand for “unconditional surrender” does not seem like a formula that opens space for negotiations, but rather like a political message of maximum pressure. On the Iranian side, every new wave of retaliation further weakens the position of those who would advocate restraint or the renewal of negotiations. In such an atmosphere, negotiations are possible only as a quiet, intermediary, and phased process, probably through states that have channels to both sides. Public diplomacy is currently almost suppressed by the logic of war.
Still, the death of the supreme leader may paradoxically open a certain, very narrow space for political redirection. New or transitional leadership, faced with war, economic pressure, and the threat of further breakdown in regional relations, could conclude that it needs a controlled exit from the crisis in order to stabilize the internal order. But that would require at least three conditions: relative discipline within Iranian security structures, the willingness of Washington and Jerusalem to limit their aims, and an intermediary framework that both sides can accept without formal political humiliation.
What comes next for Iran and the region
Iran today is facing a triple trial. The first is military: how to respond to the continuation of strikes without entering a spiral that would further devastate the country and the region. The second is political: how to resolve the question of supreme succession without an internal split that would weaken the very core of the regime. The third is international: how to avoid having some neighboring states, which are already exposed to attacks and consequences, definitively align themselves in a firmer anti-Iranian bloc.
For Israel and the United States, too, a phase of high risk lies ahead. The removal of Khamenei can be seen as a major tactical victory, but it in itself does not guarantee a strategic outcome. History shows that toppling or weakening the top of a regime does not automatically produce a more stable order or a faster capitulation. Sometimes it opens a period of radicalization, internal struggle for succession, and unpredictable security consequences that spill across borders.
The most realistic description of the situation is therefore neither that Iran is on the verge of an immediate collapse nor that the regime has shown full resilience. It is more accurate to say that the country has entered the most dangerous transition since the Islamic Revolution, at a moment when war and the question of succession are unfolding simultaneously. If in the coming days no convincing signal appears of a more stable decision-making chain in Tehran and at least minimal diplomatic communication among the opposing sides, the Middle East could enter a new phase of conflict in which it will no longer be only about Iran after the strikes, but about the reordering of the entire regional order under the pressure of war, energy, and the struggle for power.
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