Iran expands its response after the liquidation of the top of the security apparatus
The Iranian response to the latest wave of targeted liquidations at the very top of the state and security apparatus has opened a new, more dangerous phase of the crisis in the Middle East. After Iranian and foreign media on March 17 confirmed the deaths of Ali Larijani, head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and General Gholam Reza Soleimani, commander of the Basij, Tehran intensified missile and drone strikes toward Israel, but also toward targets in part of the Gulf states. In doing so, the conflict, which had already had regional consequences earlier, moved even further beyond the framework of a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel and grew into a security threat affecting energy flows, maritime traffic, and diplomatic relations across a much wider area.
According to reports by AP and Reuters, as well as confirmations carried by leading international media, Larijani’s death in Tehran represents one of the strongest blows to Iran’s political-security leadership since the beginning of the current war escalation. The Israeli side announced that in a separate attack Gholam Reza Soleimani was also killed, the commander of the Basij, a paramilitary organization within the broader structure of the Revolutionary Guard that has an important role in internal repression, mobilization, and surveillance. For Tehran, this is not only a military blow, but also a political message that the opponent possesses intelligence penetration deep enough to hit the most protected points of the system.
Liquidations that change the logic of the conflict
Ali Larijani had for years been one of the more recognizable figures in Iranian politics. In different periods he held a series of key positions, from parliament speaker to a man who had an important role in national security and strategic decision-making. In the new circumstances, after previous strikes on the Iranian state leadership, his position was additionally sensitive because it connected the security, political, and diplomatic segments of decision-making. His death therefore has a broader meaning than the mere elimination of one official: it is a strike on the regime’s coordination center at a moment when Iran is trying to show that it can still conduct a multi-level response.
The same largely applies to Gholam Reza Soleimani. The Basij is not merely an auxiliary formation, but an important pillar of the system, especially in periods of crisis and in controlling the internal space. The killing of its commander at a moment of intensified external strikes and internal tension further intensifies the sense of vulnerability within the Iranian apparatus. That is why the Iranian response was almost expected: not only a demonstration of retaliation against Israel, but also a message to states in the region that Tehran considers any infrastructure, base, or territory that it assesses to serve American or Israeli operations to be legitimate targets.
Such a framework of Iranian threat is not new, but in recent days it has taken on a more concrete and more dangerous form. The joint statement by the United States and several Gulf states of March 1 had already spoken about Iranian missile and drone attacks across the region. Meanwhile, on March 11 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2817, condemning Iranian attacks on neighboring states. This shows that the international community had already begun earlier to treat this crisis as a regional, and not merely bilateral, problem. The killings of Larijani and Soleimani have now further accelerated that regionalization of the conflict.
Attacks on Israel and the Gulf states
After confirmation of the liquidations, Iran, according to available information, launched a new wave of missiles and drones toward Israel and toward targets in the Gulf states. The Associated Press reported that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates were among the targets. In such a pattern of strikes, it is especially important that Iran no longer remains exclusively at the symbolism of “direct revenge” against Israel, but is trying to raise the cost of the war for states it sees as part of Washington’s broader security chain as well.
This expansion of the battlefield has several consequences. The first is purely military: the air-defense capacities of the Gulf monarchies and their allies are further burdened by waves of missiles and unmanned aircraft. The second is political: countries that sought to balance between condemning Iranian actions and avoiding open confrontation are now under greater pressure to align themselves more clearly. The third is economic and global: every attack on energy facilities, ports, fuel depots, or logistics hubs immediately spills over into oil, gas, and transport markets.
According to the International Energy Agency, an average of around 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed daily through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025, making that passage one of the world’s most important energy “chokepoints.” In its March 2026 report, the IEA warned that the war in the Middle East is already creating the greatest oil supply disruption in the history of the global market, with a drastic drop in flows through Hormuz. In other words, when Iran expands its response toward the Gulf area, it is not only threatening neighbors and American bases, but also striking infrastructure through which a large part of the world’s energy trade passes.
Pressure on Washington and the risk of a wider war
For Washington, this is a particularly sensitive moment. Every new Iranian salvo toward the Gulf states increases pressure on the American administration to react more strongly in order to protect its bases, allies, and maritime routes. But this is precisely where the paradox of the current phase of the conflict lies: a stronger American response may show determination in the short term, but at the same time further strengthen Iran’s argument that it is waging a defensive war against a broad coalition. This creates a spiral in which each side presents its own escalation as a necessary reaction to the moves of the other.
The U.S. State Department and partners from the region condemned Iranian missile and drone attacks in a joint statement with Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at the very beginning of the month. In the meantime, additional American messages have arrived that the protection of troops and infrastructure will remain a priority. But the problem for Washington is not only the defense of existing positions. The problem is also the political cost of a possible widening of the war at a moment when every new strike increases the danger of a greater number of civilian casualties, disruptions in energy supplies, and the destabilization of partners on whom the United States relies in the region.
The United Nations has on several occasions warned that the situation could get out of control. Secretary-General António Guterres on February 28 and March 6 called for urgent de-escalation, a ceasefire, and a return to serious negotiations, warning that strikes and counterstrikes threaten civilians and the global economy. After the latest liquidations, those warnings appear even more serious, because the war can increasingly less be described as a limited exchange of strikes, and increasingly more as a multi-sided conflict with open possibilities of spillover.
Why the Strait of Hormuz remains the central issue
The geography of the Middle East itself explains why the expansion of the Iranian response is so important. The Strait of Hormuz is not only a symbolic space of competition between Tehran and Washington, but a vital traffic route through which oil, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas move. Whenever Iran signals that it can complicate or selectively restrict traffic through that passage, markets react almost instantly. This month, the IEA warned that flows through Hormuz had fallen from approximately 20 million barrels a day before the war to only a small portion of that volume, and the Gulf countries have already had to cut production.
The consequence is not only the rise in crude oil prices. Disruptions also spill over into shipping traffic, insurance, fuel prices, industrial costs, and supply chains. In practice, this means that the crisis in Iran and around Iran is no longer only a matter of regional security, but also a factor of global inflation and industrial uncertainty. That is precisely why diplomats and energy analysts in recent days are increasingly warning that the further militarization of the Gulf area could produce consequences that will not remain confined to the Middle East.
In that calculation, a special problem is the fact that Iran does not have to formally “close” Hormuz to produce an effect. Repeated attacks, threats, interruptions to navigation, strikes on terminals, and rising insurance premiums are enough for traffic to slow down, be rerouted, or become more expensive. In other words, even limited but permanent insecurity can have almost the same effect as a full blockade. That is why every new round of strikes, especially when it includes the territories of the Gulf states, is a signal to the markets that the security of navigation has become part of military strategy itself.
Tehran’s political message and the region’s response
From the Iranian perspective, the expansion of attacks has a dual function. The first is internal: to show the domestic public and the security apparatus that the state, despite losses at the top, is not paralyzed. The second is external: to convince opponents that the price of further liquidations and strikes will not be limited to Israeli territory. When Tehran sends the message that it will target bases and facilities in the region if they serve operations against Iran, it is trying to increase the strategic cost for Washington and its partners, but also to introduce additional unease among Gulf governments that do not want to become the main battlefield.
Reactions in the region for now show precisely that pattern. The Gulf states on one side publicly condemn Iranian attacks, and on the other try to avoid a situation in which they would become direct and long-term participants in the war. The joint statement of GCC and European Union ministers of March 5 was very sharp toward Tehran, but at the same time it also emphasized the need for stabilization and preventing the further spread of the conflict. This reveals the basic dilemma of regional actors: how to protect their own security without being fully drawn into a war whose outcome they cannot control.
European capitals, too, do not view the crisis only through a military prism. The European Union in several statements called for maximum restraint, the protection of civilians, and respect for international law. The reason is not only political, but also economic. Every major disruption of deliveries from the Persian Gulf directly affects European energy markets, industrial competitiveness, and the cost of living. In that sense, the news of the liquidation of Larijani and Soleimani did not remain only an episode in a series of military strikes, but was immediately recognized as a possible trigger of a new wave of regional destabilization.
What follows after the strike on the top of the system
The most important question now is whether Iran can keep its response at the level of controlled escalation or whether the logic of retaliation will continue to expand the circle of targets. According to the pattern so far, Tehran is trying to combine military pressure, political symbolism, and economic effect. Through strikes it wants to show that it can hit both Israel and the Gulf area, while at the same time leaving enough uncertainty so that the opponent cannot be sure where the threshold of “limited” retaliation ends. But precisely that uncertainty is the main source of danger, because it increases the possibility of miscalculation, accidental expansion of the battlefield, and more direct American involvement.
Nor is the internal dimension negligible. Liquidations of high-ranking officials as a rule do not automatically mean the weakening of the repressive apparatus, but they reveal cracks in the system of security and control. If the Iranian leadership concludes that it is threatened by further erosion of authority, it could resort to an even fiercer external response in order to compensate for internal vulnerability. On the other hand, if it judges that the risk threshold is too high, it could try to open space for mediation through regional or international channels. For now, there are not enough indications that a diplomatic exit is near.
What is currently clear is that the liquidations of Ali Larijani and Gholam Reza Soleimani have changed the tone and breadth of the Iranian response. The conflict can no longer be viewed only as a series of isolated strikes between two states. It encompasses the Gulf monarchies, the American military presence, energy infrastructure, and global supply routes. In such an environment, every new missile or drone is no longer only a military move, but also a signal to markets, allies, and mediators that the Middle East is dangerously approaching the point at which political control over escalation will become ever weaker.
Sources:- Associated Press – report on the Iranian missile and drone response after the killing of Ali Larijani and General Gholam Reza Soleimani (link)- The Guardian / Reuters – confirmation of the death of Ali Larijani and Israel’s claims about the killing of Gholam Reza Soleimani (link)- United Nations – statement by the Secretary-General on the danger of a wider war and a call for de-escalation of February 28, 2026 (link)- United Nations – statement by the Secretary-General on the Middle East of March 6, 2026, and a warning about the risk to the global economy (link)- United Nations – the Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 (2026), condemning Iranian attacks on neighboring states (link)- U.S. Department of State – joint statement by the United States and several Gulf states on Iranian missile and drone attacks in the region (link)- International Energy Agency – profile of the Strait of Hormuz as a key global energy route (link)- International Energy Agency – Oil Market Report for March 2026 on the biggest oil supply disruption in the history of the market (link)- Council of the European Union – joint statement by GCC-EU ministers on Iranian attacks on the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (link)- Council of the European Union – overview of the EU’s position on developments in Iran and the Middle East (link)
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