Gaza enters a new phase of crisis after regional escalation
The fragile respite that had at least partially eased daily life in the Gaza Strip in recent months has once again been called into question after the spread of the regional conflict and the worsening of security circumstances at the beginning of March. Humanitarian operations, which had been gradually resuming after the ceasefire of October 10, 2025, have faced new restrictions, the closure of crossings, and interruptions to medical evacuations. As a result, Gaza has once again entered a period of uncertainty in which three processes are breaking at the same time: the struggle for the population’s bare survival, attempts by the international community to preserve the post-war plan, and Hamas’s effort to preserve or restore political and administrative influence on the ground.
According to data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and UNRWA, the regional escalation immediately spilled over into daily life in Gaza. Aid restrictions were intensified by the closure of crossings, the suspension of coordination for humanitarian movement, medical evacuations, the return of residents from abroad, and staff rotations. The consequence is not only an operational standstill but also rising prices, additional pressure on households that are already almost completely dependent on aid, and a new slowdown in the already modest recovery that became visible at the beginning of the year.
From partial relief to a new standstill
At the beginning of 2026, the first limited signs of stabilization appeared in Gaza. OCHA recorded the reopening of Rafah for limited passenger traffic, which for the first time after almost eleven months enabled additional medical evacuations and the return of some residents. A report dated February 27 states that since the crossing reopened at the beginning of February, the World Health Organization enabled the evacuation of 289 patients accompanied by 521 companions. Such developments did not mean normalization, but for thousands of families they represented a rare signal that at least some of the most severe humanitarian needs could be addressed outside the war-ravaged enclave.
However, that limited recovery proved extremely fragile. OCHA’s humanitarian report of March 6 states that following the regional escalation, crossings were closed and movement coordination was suspended, directly affecting aid deliveries and the exit of seriously ill and wounded people for treatment. This interrupted one of the rare mechanisms that had produced visible results in recent weeks. In practice, this means that even the little room for respite can close within a few hours when the regional security framework collapses again.
For Gaza’s residents, the problem is not only the physical closure of crossings but also the effect such decisions have on the entire local market. When the inflow of goods becomes unstable, the prices of food, fuel, and basic necessities rise, and humanitarian organizations are left without room to maneuver. At the beginning of March, Le Monde, citing conditions on the ground, reported that after the reopening of Kerem Shalom, approximately 200 to 250 aid trucks were entering the enclave daily, which is still significantly below the level the United Nations considers necessary. In such circumstances, every new closure or restriction has a multiplier effect: shortages accelerate, prices surge, and humanitarian logistics move from the phase of improvisation to the phase of crisis management.
The toll of war remains devastating, and even the ceasefire brings new victims
And while there is talk of a ceasefire, the figures show that the violence has not disappeared. In a report published at the beginning of March, UNRWA, citing data from the Ministry of Health in Gaza transmitted by OCHA, stated that between October 7, 2023, and February 16, 2026, 72,063 Palestinians were killed in Gaza and 171,726 were injured. The same source states that even after the ceasefire came into effect in October 2025, a further increase in casualties was recorded. In its report of March 6, OCHA stated that between February 26 and March 5, new killings, injuries, and the recovery of bodies from the rubble were reported, while the UN Human Rights Office recorded hundreds of Palestinians killed both near the so-called yellow line and in attacks far from it since the beginning of the ceasefire.
This is one of the key reasons why the term “post-war plan” is used very cautiously in Gaza. The formal end of major combat operations did not automatically create the conditions for real reconstruction. Large parts of the infrastructure remain destroyed, the health system is overwhelmed, and the security environment is so unstable that even humanitarian workers move under constant risk. In its latest reports, UNRWA also warns of the health consequences of prolonged destruction, including an increase in skin and waterborne infections, as well as additional problems for people with disabilities, amputations, spinal injuries, and traumatic brain injuries.
A particular problem is the fact that even after several months of ceasefire, there can be no talk of a predictable access regime. When medical evacuations, aid deliveries, or the rotation of humanitarian personnel depend on a daily assessment of security risk, the entire system remains vulnerable. This is reflected not only in statistics but also in the daily decisions of families waiting for medicine, surgery, drinking water, or temporary shelter.
Hamas uses the vacuum and tries to consolidate its position
While international actors deal with broader regional consequences, another kind of political struggle is taking place on the ground: who actually governs Gaza and who will have real control if the post-war plan survives. The Washington Post writes that after the initial improvement in conditions, recovery has stalled, while Hamas is simultaneously restoring administrative influence in parts of Gaza and once again taking over some civilian functions. This does not mean that the question of power has been resolved; quite the opposite: it shows how fragile the transitional governance model is when it cannot rely on a stable security and logistical foundation.
At the beginning of 2026, Hamas publicly signaled its readiness to dissolve its government in Gaza when a new role is assumed by the Palestinian technocratic body envisaged by the peace arrangements. The Associated Press reported in January that Hamas had said it would dissolve its own government when such a body takes over governance. However, the political statement itself did not resolve the fundamental question: can an actual transfer of power be carried out in circumstances where Hamas still has an organizational network on the ground, while the security and humanitarian picture remains changeable from day to day.
This is precisely where the key tension of the current phase of the crisis arises. On the one hand, several international and regional actors want a model in which Gaza would not remain under Hamas’s direct rule. On the other hand, every vacuum in governance, the distribution of goods, price regulation, and the maintenance of basic order opens space for Hamas to once again present itself as the only structure capable of operating on the ground. In a situation in which the population depends on aid networks, local distribution, and minimal administrative functionality, political influence is built not only with weapons but also through control of daily life.
The post-war plan exists on paper, but its implementation is becoming increasingly uncertain
In recent months, Gaza’s political future has formally been tied to a broader international framework. On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council supported the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Conflict in Gaza” with Resolution 2803, welcomed the establishment of the Board of Peace, and approved the formation of temporary international stabilization forces. The U.S. State Department then spoke publicly in January and February 2026 about that body as a mechanism that should help implement the political and security transition in Gaza. At a meeting in Washington in February, according to AP, multibillion-dollar financial commitments and promises of contributions to future stabilization forces were also announced.
On paper, this looks like the beginning of a structured exit from war: a ceasefire, a transitional Palestinian administration, international stabilization, infrastructure reconstruction, and gradual political realignment. In reality, however, almost every one of those elements remains disputed. The question of Hamas’s disarmament has not been resolved, it is not clear how the legitimacy and operational capability of the new Palestinian technocratic leadership would be fully ensured, and even the minimum regional security needed for reconstruction is not stable. That is precisely why the latest escalation with Iran proved so destructive for a plan that had only just begun to take shape.
The Washington Post warns that the expansion of the conflict toward Iran has introduced serious doubt into the feasibility of already agreed elements of reconstruction and international engagement. If the countries that were supposed to finance or militarily support the transitional phase now shift their priorities to the broader regional confrontation, Gaza once again risks being left without a viable political framework, even if the formal ceasefire is not completely broken.
Humanitarian aid is no longer just logistics, but also a political issue
Any discussion about Gaza today is actually conducted on two levels. The first is immediate: how much food, medicine, fuel, and how many medical evacuations can pass through the crossings. The second is strategic: who controls that flow and under what political conditions. As early as the beginning of March, OCHA warned that the closure of crossings and the suspension of coordination were increasing the population’s dependence on aid. That is a humanitarian fact, but also a political reality, because whoever can influence the inflow of goods and access to aid indirectly shapes the balance of power on the ground.
That is why the issue of aid in Gaza is never merely technical. If the inflow of goods is unstable, the space for smuggling, local intermediaries, control of distribution, and the political influence of actors who can intervene where the official system fails increases. At the same time, international organizations warn that without predictable and secure access, they cannot plan even basic operations, from supplying shelters to caring for the seriously ill. In such an environment, humanitarian corridors are not merely delivery routes, but one of the most important levers of power.
This is also the broader paradox of the current moment. Formally, part of the international community speaks of a transitional administration, reconstruction, and a new political phase. On the ground, however, battles are still being fought over whether an aid truck can pass, whether a patient can leave for treatment, and whether humanitarian staff can safely change shifts. Until that level is stabilized, every political construction will remain fragile.
What comes next for Gaza
Gaza is thus entering a new phase of crisis in which war is no longer measured only by the intensity of airstrikes or ground operations, but also by the ability to maintain a minimum of order after the formal ceasefire. The latest developments show that the post-war plan is far more vulnerable than it seemed at the beginning of the year. A single regional escalation is enough to close crossings, halt evacuations, raise food prices, and open a new political vacuum.
For Gaza’s residents, this means a return to a state in which everything is temporary: security, aid, the possibility of treatment, and even the very idea of reconstruction. For international actors, this is a test of whether they can simultaneously maintain the humanitarian response and the political architecture that is supposed to prevent a new total collapse. And for Hamas, this is the moment in which, despite public messages about a possible transfer of power, it is trying on the ground to show that daily life still cannot be governed without its network. That is precisely why the focus is no longer only on the ceasefire, but on a far more difficult question: can the collapse of a plan that was weak, slow, and deeply contested even before this escalation be prevented.
Sources:- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – humanitarian report of March 6, 2026, on the effect of regional escalation on crossings, aid, medical evacuations, and rising prices in Gaza (link)
- OCHA – Humanitarian Situation Update #357 report on the limited reopening of Rafah and the continuing risk for civilians in Gaza (link)
- OCHA – Gaza Humanitarian Response, Situation Report No. 69, with data on limited traffic through Rafah and medical evacuations coordinated by the WHO (link)
- UNRWA – Situation Report #211 on the unstable security situation, the danger of regional escalation, and the humanitarian consequences in Gaza (link)
- UNRWA – Situation Report #210 with data on the total number of dead and wounded and the health consequences of the war in Gaza (link)
- Washington Post – analysis of March 11, 2026, on how the strike on Iran halted Gaza’s fragile recovery and how Hamas is restoring administrative influence (link)
- Associated Press – report from January 2026 on Hamas’s message that it will dissolve the government in Gaza when the transitional Palestinian technocratic body takes over governance (link)
- UN Security Council – Resolution 2803 from November 2025 on support for the comprehensive plan to end the conflict in Gaza, the Board of Peace, and temporary stabilization forces (link)
- United Nations Press – summary of the Security Council meeting of November 17, 2025, on the adoption of Resolution 2803 and the international framework for the transition in Gaza (link)
- U.S. Department of State – addresses by Marco Rubio in January and February 2026 on the Board of Peace and the political vision for Gaza’s future (link; link)
- Le Monde – report of March 6, 2026, on the halt of medical evacuations, the limited number of aid trucks, and the renewed deterioration of humanitarian conditions after the regional escalation (link)
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