From rhythm to silence: how “America First” policy is emptying Cuban beaches and striking at the livelihoods of ordinary people
For decades, Cuban tourism held an almost cinematic status in the global imagination: Havana as a postcard of vintage cars and colonial facades, Varadero as a synonym for a Caribbean holiday, and music, dance, and street life as an almost obligatory part of every travel description of the island. But in the spring of 2026, the picture is significantly different. Emptier beaches, cancelled and shortened flights, fuel shortages, power outages lasting hours and days, and an ever weaker inflow of foreign guests have turned tourism, once a key source of foreign currency, into yet another focal point of Cuba’s crisis. At the center of this change is a combination of long-term structural weaknesses in the Cuban economy and a new tightening of American policy toward Havana during President Donald Trump’s term, who, under the banner of the “America First” policy, renewed and intensified pressure on the island.
American policy toward Cuba has become tougher again
Washington had not been lenient toward Cuba before either, but during 2025 and at the beginning of 2026, policy became even stricter. In June 2025, the White House renewed and amended presidential memorandum NSPM-5, which reaffirmed support for the embargo and once again emphasized the obligation of strictly enforcing the statutory ban on tourist travel by Americans to Cuba. That document explicitly states that the American administration wants to end economic practices which, according to its interpretation, disproportionately benefit the Cuban state and the military, security, and intelligence structures, rather than the Cuban population. At the same time, Washington continued to restrict financial flows and business dealings with entities linked to the Cuban state apparatus, especially those on the so-called Cuba Restricted List, which includes numerous entities connected to the military-state conglomerate that also plays an important role in tourism.
For the Cuban tourism sector, it is particularly important that American pressure did not stop only at travel rules. At the end of January 2026, Trump, according to reports by American and international media, further tightened the approach toward Cuba’s energy supply, primarily through a measure that threatens tariff consequences for countries that sell or deliver oil to Cuba. The consequence is not only diplomatic tension, but also a very concrete blow to fuel supply. Cuba, whose electricity system and transport have for years depended on imported fuel, has thereby entered even deeper energy uncertainty.
Tourism had already fallen before, but the figures are now even worse
Official data from Cuba’s National Office of Statistics and Information, ONEI, show that 2025 ended significantly worse than 2024. In the period from January to December 2025, Cuba recorded 1,810,663 visitors, while a year earlier there had been 2,203,117. That means a decline to 82.2 percent of the 2024 level. The problem becomes even clearer when related indicators are examined: the number of overnight stays fell from 12,831,500 to 10,874,614, the occupancy rate from 23.0 to 18.9 percent, and the revenues of tourism entities from 120.65 billion to 109.43 billion Cuban pesos. In other words, it is not only about fewer people coming to Cuba, but also about the sector filling hotels less effectively, generating less spending, and finding it harder to maintain operational sustainability.
The beginning of 2026 further worsened the picture. According to preliminary data from ONEI, in January 2026 Cuba had 184,833 international visitors, which is 11,512 fewer than in the same month of 2025. February was even more serious: by the end of February 2026, a total of 262,496 international visitors had been recorded, compared with 374,267 in the same period of 2025, that is, 112,642 fewer. That fall to 70 percent of last year’s level shows that the trend can no longer be described as a slow post-pandemic recovery that is stalling, but rather as a deep deterioration at a time when global tourism, according to UN Tourism data, continues to grow overall.
When fuel disappears, tourism does not stop only at the airport
For tourism economies, air transport is not a luxury, but basic infrastructure. That is precisely why the decision of the Cuban authorities from February 2026, by which airlines were warned that jet fuel would temporarily not be available at nine airports, including Havana’s José Martí, had the effect of an alarm. Associated Press reported that Air Canada had already suspended flights to the island on February 9, while other companies had to introduce additional stops to refuel in third countries. At the beginning of March, AP also reported that Air France was suspending the Paris–Havana route from March 28 to June 15, 2026, precisely because of fuel shortages and operational difficulties.
This has a chain effect that is not visible only on the runway. If long European and North American routes become unreliable or too expensive, Cuba automatically loses some of its most valuable guests, those who stay longer and spend more. When this is compounded by problems with local transport, food distribution, hotel operations, and electricity supply, the tourism product becomes unstable even for travelers willing to tolerate certain difficulties. For a country that must seek foreign currency precisely through the export of services, that is a very serious blow.
Black days for Cuba’s electricity grid
The energy crisis is not an incidental element of the story, but its core. During March 2026, Cuba suffered several major disruptions to the electricity grid, including a complete collapse of the national system. Reuters reported in mid-March that the grid collapse left around 10 million people without electricity. Associated Press then recorded that by the end of March it was already the third national grid breakdown in the same month. In the tourism industry, such events are not merely a technical problem. They mean loss of air conditioning in hotels, disruptions in food cold chains, hampered operation of restaurants and health services, weaker internet and telephone connectivity, and an additional burden on already overworked staff.
The Cuban authorities see the causes in a combination of outdated infrastructure, lack of fuel, and external pressure on energy supply. Critics of the Cuban system, on the other hand, warn that the current situation cannot be explained only by sanctions, but also by years of insufficient investment, centralized management, and the weak productivity of the domestic economy. Both dimensions are important. Sanctions and energy pressure worsen the situation, but they fall on a system that was already fragile. For ordinary Cubans, the debate over the share of each individual cause changes everyday life very little: when there is no electricity, there is no work, no transport, and no stable income.
The greatest burden is not borne by the political elite, but by workers and small entrepreneurs
In official political statements in both Washington and Havana, there is often talk of “pressure on the regime” or of the “defense of sovereignty.” But the decline in tourism most directly affects people who are neither the creators of American policy nor decision-makers in the Cuban state. These are taxi drivers, private room renters, waiters, cooks, musicians, guides, artisans, souvenir sellers, and hotel workers. Reuters has in recent days, through feature-report scenes from tourist zones and smaller towns, shown precisely that quiet layer of the crisis: empty shores, moored boats, and stalls without customers, at a moment when international arrivals in February fell by 56 percent compared with a year earlier.
In the Cuban case, it is particularly important that tourism is not just one of the sectors, but also the channel through which “hard” currency reaches the local population. When hotels operate more weakly, private service providers also earn less, and spending in restaurants, transport, and the informal economy also decreases. In a country with chronic shortages of goods and low real incomes, tourism had been for many a buffer between the official salary and actual living costs. The weakening of that buffer means deeper impoverishment, greater dependence on remittances from abroad, and a stronger incentive to emigrate.
The decline in tourist interest is happening at a time when the world is traveling more
The Cuban case stands out even more when compared with the international environment. UN Tourism announced that international tourist arrivals in the first nine months of 2025 rose by five percent compared with the same period of 2024, with more than 1.1 billion journeys and a level already above the pre-pandemic year 2019. While much of the world is recording a continued recovery and growing demand, Cuba is moving in the opposite direction. This shows that the problem is not only in global demand, ticket prices, or changes in travelers’ habits. The problem is specifically Cuban and arises from a combination of political risk, infrastructural instability, and the limited ability of the state to ensure the basic conditions for the normal functioning of the sector.
For some travelers, Cuba still has a strong symbolic appeal. But in the end, tourism is not sold only on the basis of atmosphere and historical image. It is sold through the reliability of flights, the availability of fuel, the functioning of the electricity grid, hotel supplies, the feeling of safety, and the predictability of service. When these elements become uncertain, even destinations with a strong identity lose the race to the competition.
Can Cuba reverse the trend
In the short term, there is not much room for a rapid recovery. The American administration is showing no signs of easing, and official documents from Washington suggest that the pressure strategy is part of a broader political project toward Cuba. On the other hand, at the end of February 2026, OFAC opened the possibility of more favorable licensing for certain requests that would allow the resale of Venezuelan oil for use in Cuba, but with the strict restriction that such business must not benefit entities connected to the Cuban military and state structures from the American restrictive list. This is a signal that Washington wants to distinguish support for the private sector from support for the state, but in practice the question is how quickly and to what extent such a model can stabilize energy supply.
For Havana, the problem is even deeper: even if some of the supply channels were repaired, outdated infrastructure, low occupancy, weakened confidence of airlines, and the destination’s growing reputational damage would remain. The tourism industry can endure political tensions, but it endures much less easily a combination of uncertain flights, prolonged power outages, and declining quality of everyday services. That is precisely why the current crisis cannot be viewed only as another cyclical seasonal downturn, but as a sign that one of Cuba’s most important economic pillars has been seriously shaken.
Behind geopolitics, silence remains on the beaches
In political centers of power, sanctions are often presented as an instrument of pressure on the authorities, and in official Cuban narratives as proof of external aggression. But between those two versions of the story remains the everyday life of people who live from tourism. When a flight is cancelled, it is not a ministry that loses income, but the driver who was supposed to meet the guests. When a hotel operates at half capacity, the blow is felt not only by state statistics, but also by the cook, the housekeeper, the musician, and the small renter. On April 15, 2026, Cuba is ever farther from the image of Caribbean carefree life with which it was sold to the world for years. Instead of rhythm and playfulness, many tourist zones today are marked by silence, emptiness, and uncertainty, and the highest price of this geopolitical confrontation is once again being paid by those who decide about it the least.
Sources:- The White House – presidential memorandum NSPM-5 and official summary of the strengthening of American policy toward Cuba (link)- The White House – official overview of the measures of Donald Trump’s administration toward Cuba from 2025 and 2026 (link)- U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC – overview of the sanctions program toward Cuba and official guidelines (link)- U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFAC – FAQ 1238 on the possibility of licensing the resale of Venezuelan oil for use in Cuba (link)- ONEI – official Cuban statistical overview of tourism for January–December 2025, including the number of visitors, overnight stays, revenues, and occupancy (link)- ONEI – preliminary data on international visitors in January 2026 (link)- ONEI – preliminary data on international visitors through the end of February 2026 (link)- Associated Press – report on jet fuel shortages, flight suspensions, and the consequences for Cuban tourism (link)- Associated Press – report on the temporary suspension of the Air France route between Paris and Havana (link)- Reuters – photo reports and reports on the decline of tourism, fuel shortages, and the collapse of the electricity grid in March and April 2026 (link)- UN Tourism – global data on the growth of international tourist arrivals in 2025 as a broader context for comparison (link)
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